China, Poland, Germany: The Structure of Ukraine’s Foreign Trade and What It Means for Your Contract

International Contracts | JVS Law

The most important thing about Ukraine’s foreign trade fits in one line: in the first half of 2026 China sold Ukraine USD 13.9 billion of goods and bought USD 0.78 billion. A ratio of almost eighteen to one.

That is not background colour for an economic review. It is the starting data for a lawyer. Where your client is the buyer, the risk sits at the front of the deal: who is being paid in advance, and does that counterparty exist as described. Where your client is the seller, the risk moves to the back: will the goods be accepted, do they meet European requirements, and what will you enforce against.

Below is the actual structure of the trade along the three corridors that carry most of the volume, what each means for the text of a contract, and — separately — why the numbers you will read about that same trade never agree with one another.

On State Customs Service data for the first half of 2026, the five largest partners occupy fundamentally different roles. This is not a ranking — it is four different legal configurations.

Italy, Hungary, the Netherlands, Czechia and Slovakia follow, each on roughly USD 1.6–2.7 billion of turnover. More than half the total volume rests on the first five partners, and that concentration is itself a risk: a regulatory change on one corridor touches a disproportionate share of transactions.

Official statistics give the same picture on a different scale. For the first nine months of 2025 the State Statistics Service records exports of USD 29,572.1 million (95.9% of the same period in 2024), imports of USD 60,191.0 million (117.5%) and a negative balance of USD 30,618.9 million. The export-to-import coverage ratio fell from 0.60 to 0.49: for every dollar of goods coming in, Ukraine ships out less than fifty cents. Trade was conducted with partners in 222 countries.

The question comes up whenever a client arrives with two publications carrying different numbers and asks which one is lying. Neither is. There are at least three structural reasons.

There are three sources, and they count different things. The State Statistics Service runs a statistical observation on UN methodology. The State Customs Service compiles from customs declarations. The National Bank measures trade inside the balance of payments. The three have issued a joint clarification on the discrepancies in their own data — the existence of such a document tells you the size of the problem.

Statistical imports are not taxed imports. The customs service puts it plainly: the two concepts are not identical, rest on different methodologies and answer different questions. Statistical imports are compiled from the declarations that complete clearance, whether or not duties were paid. Taxed imports are the tax base. The same shipment lands in different lines.

The data moves retroactively. This is where the legal mechanics become visible. Under Article 260(1) of the Customs Code, a declarant without precise particulars of the goods files a temporary declaration against an undertaking to file a supplementary one within 45 days. Article 260(4) allows a periodic declaration covering regular movements for up to 180 days. Customs warns expressly that data from supplementary declarations may relate to operations that actually took place in earlier reporting periods. The figure for last quarter changes after the quarter has closed.

And official statistics lag. As at August 2026 the State Statistics Service key-indicators summary still shows January–September 2025 as the latest foreign-trade period. Final revision of the data is carried out in May of the year following the reporting year. Any publication offering “2025 full-year results” is therefore working from customs data, not statistics — worth checking before someone’s figure goes into a memorandum.

You can verify it yourself: the customs service has opened a trade BI system showing import and export volumes by any country and any commodity, with export to Excel.

USD 13.9 billion in against USD 0.78 billion out is not a partnership; it is a procurement channel. The legal consequences are specific, and none of them is about choice of law.

The counterparty has to exist. The most expensive losses on this corridor are not disputes but prepayments to a company that does not exist, or that exists but trades outside the scope of its licence. PRC registers are public and the check can be run directly, by name and unified social credit code. We have set the procedure out step by step: how to check a Chinese company.

The CISG applies — with a trap on the Ukrainian side. The Convention has 97 States parties, Ukraine and China among them. But Ukraine’s accession carried a declaration under Articles 12 and 96, and that declaration is still in force: the contract, its modification and its termination must be in writing. China no longer maintains an equivalent declaration. The practical consequence runs one way and helps you only if you know about it: a variation of specification or delivery date agreed in a messaging app and never documented does not bind the Ukrainian side. It is the most common reason “but we agreed” fails in a dispute.

The dispute will not be heard where you assume. A Chinese counterparty’s standard clause routes to CIETAC, and the consequences are worth understanding before signature rather than after: how an arbitration clause determines the outcome of a dispute with a Chinese partner.

Add route screening against sanctions and — for equipment and components — the dual-use regime, which in recent years has stopped being exotic for ordinary importers.

Poland is the only large partner where Ukrainian exports form a visible share of turnover: USD 2.38 billion against USD 4.67 billion inbound. Germany is closer to the Chinese pattern (3.75 against 1.27) but with different content — equipment rather than consumer goods.

When you sell rather than buy, the question set changes completely.

• Product conformity. A European buyer is not buying goods, it is buying goods with documents. Labelling, certification and technical standards are contract subject-matter, not a post-shipment formality; who carries the risk of non-conformity has to be written down.
• Incoterms as risk allocation, not three letters. Disputes regularly reveal that the parties agreed a term inconsistent with the actual logistics, and the moment risk passed turns out not to be where either of them expected.
• Currency, payment periods and banking compliance — on the European corridor these are largely documentary questions rather than restrictions.

And one change most template contracts have yet to absorb. Until recently a Ukrainian court judgment could not be enforced abroad, so contracts named arbitration almost automatically. Since 1 September 2023 the 2019 Hague Judgments Convention has been in force for Ukraine — the same day as for the European Union. On the European corridor the court route has opened, and the clause deserves a deliberate choice. We have covered that, and the limits that come with it, separately: arbitration or court in a cross-border contract.

One trap hides there for carriage contracts: the 2019 Convention does not extend to the carriage of passengers and goods. For an exporter in dispute with a carrier rather than a buyer, the court route abroad remains shut.

A question rarely asked, though it concerns everyone. The answer is in Article 11 of the Customs Code, and it has two parts.

The general rule is that information obtained by customs is used for customs purposes only and is not passed to third parties. But paragraph 4 removes from restricted access the details of specific export and import operations where the declarant has consented to publication, along with a set of particulars from the declaration under Article 257(8). And paragraph 5 states expressly that publishing anonymised aggregate and analytical information, and anonymised data on specific operations, is not disclosure.

Two practical consequences. Your counterparty can see your shipments — which is precisely why commercial counterparty-screening services work at all. And the same channel is open to you when you are checking someone else before a deal. The consent box is a decision, not a formality.

Briefly, in the order it should happen.

1. Check first, negotiate second. On the import corridor this is the cheapest action with the largest effect: registration data, ownership structure, scope of business, litigation history.
2. Writing is not a formality. Because of Ukraine’s Article 96 declaration under the CISG, document every variation. Correspondence that does not show an agreed change will not serve as proof.
3. Choose the dispute clause against the assets, not out of habit. The route should lead where the debtor’s property is; on the European corridor there are now two options.
4. Reconcile Incoterms with the actual logistics — a term copied from the previous contract is the classic cause of a dispute about when risk passed.
5. Take figures from the source, not from a retelling. If a number is going into a memorandum or a bank presentation, take it from the customs BI system or a State Statistics Service release, and state the period and the agency.

Data as at 13 August 2026. First-half 2026 figures are State Customs Service data (compilation across the largest partners); the official nine-month 2025 figures are from the State Statistics Service release of 14 November 2025, presented without the temporarily occupied territories and parts of the territories where hostilities are or were taking place. Statutory provisions are cited from the current consolidated texts on the Legislation of Ukraine portal; CISG status from the UNCITRAL table. Customs statistics are revised retroactively, so verify any figure in the customs BI system before it goes into a document.

The author is a Doctor of Laws, leads the firm’s contract practice and writes the Ukraine chapters of international practice guides. Related material: checking Chinese companies and contract structuring.