Dual-Use Technologies and Export Control in Ukraine
In short. Ukraine operates two parallel export permit regimes. Under the standing regime, a dual-use export permit costs a fixed administrative fee capped at roughly UAH 3,400. Under Cabinet of Ministers Resolution No. 875, in force since 8 July 2026, it costs 20% of the value of finished goods and technologies, and 30% for component parts. The second regime applies only where the listed dual-use item can be used to develop, produce, or operate a military product that has been codified or accepted into service by the Ministry of Defence — a fact about the customer, not about the goods. Determining which regime applies is therefore the first and most expensive question in any Ukrainian dual-use transaction.
A consignment of power semiconductors leaves a European plant for a Ukrainian buyer. The parts appear on Ukraineʼs Unified List of Dual-Use Goods. That much can be read off the datasheet.
What cannot be read off the datasheet is whether the export permit will cost a few thousand hryvnia — or thirty per cent of the value of the shipment.
Since 8 July 2026, Cabinet of Ministers Resolution No. 875 has run a separate wartime export regime alongside the standing one. Under it, permit fees are 20% of value for finished items and technologies, and 30% for component parts. Under the standing regime the fee is a fixed scale, capped at 200 statutory units — roughly UAH 3,400 — whatever the contract is worth.
One condition separates the two, and it is not a property of the goods. Resolution No. 875 reaches a listed dual-use item only where that item can be used to develop, produce, or operate a military product that has been accepted into service or codified as a supply item by the Ministry of Defence. The trigger sits on the far side of the transaction. It is a fact about what the customer builds — and the supplier often has no contractual right to know it.
That is the classification problem in this jurisdiction. Get it wrong in one direction and goods move without a permit — administrative penalty, confiscation, and a criminal provision investigated by the Security Service. Get it wrong in the other and the permit fee arrives a thousandfold above budget.
Which regime governs your transfer
Resolution No. 875 did not replace Ukraineʼs export control framework. It was laid on top of it.
The 2003 Law on State Control over International Transfers of Military and Dual-Use Goods remains the governing statute. Its two implementing procedures — Resolution No. 1807 of 2003 for military goods, and Resolution No. 86 of 2004 for dual-use goods, which carries the Unified List as its annex — remain in force. But by the express terms of the new act, they now apply only “to the extent they do not contradict” Resolution No. 875.
Four layers, then. Which one governs is a question of fact, not a property of the product.
| Layer | Instrument | Status | What it decides |
|---|---|---|---|
| Statute | Law No. 549-IV (2003) | In force | Definitions, scope of control, liability |
| Dual-use procedure | CMU Resolution No. 86 (2004) | In force, subject to No. 875 | The Unified List of Dual-Use Goods — whether your item is controlled at all |
| Military procedure | CMU Resolution No. 1807 (2003) | In force, subject to No. 875 | The Military Goods List |
| Wartime export regime | CMU Resolution No. 875 — in force 08.07.2026 | New | Whether the wartime permit track applies at all |
Classification still runs off the Unified List annexed to Resolution No. 86 — an act that has just been partially overridden by the instrument that prices the consequences. The List tells you whether you are controlled. Resolution No. 875 decides what that costs. The first determination governs the second.
Three outcomes for one component
The same physical part can land in any of three positions.
- Not on the Unified List. No export control permit required on classification grounds.
- On the Unified List, no codified military nexus. Standard permit under Resolution No. 86. The fee is the fixed scale under the 2011 schedule of administrative charges — twenty statutory units for a contract under UAH 50,000, rising to two hundred for anything above UAH 50 million. A UAH 15 million contract and a UAH 5 billion contract pay the same.
- On the Unified List, feeding a codified military item. Resolution No. 875 applies. Thirty per cent of the value of the goods.
The UAH 15 million threshold that otherwise gates the new regime does not extend to component parts and accessories. A UAH 1 million shipment of parts, correctly caught, carries a permit fee of UAH 300,000.
This page addresses classification and regime determination — which layer applies, and what it costs. For the procedural side of Resolution No. 875 — Drone Deal country eligibility, importer state guarantees, the critical goods list, Interagency Commission review, and the route back after a refusal → Defense Tech and Military Procurement. For the intellectual property architecture of technology transferred under the regime, including the prohibition on assignment of IP rights → Technology Transfer and R&D Investment.
Where this costs money
| Standard regime (Res. 86 + Res. 746) | Resolution No. 875 | |
|---|---|---|
| Applies to | Listed dual-use goods generally | Listed dual-use goods feeding a codified military item |
| Fee — finished item | Fixed scale by contract band, ceiling 200 statutory units (~UAH 3,400) | 20% of value |
| Fee — component parts | Same fixed scale | 30% of value |
| Minimum contract value | None | UAH 15 million — but not for components |
| Fee calculated on | The contract price | Ukrainian defence procurement pricing, or expert valuation |
| Paid | On issue of the permit | With the application |
| Refund on refusal | Not provided | Not provided |
Bottom line: the same component can carry a permit fee of UAH 3,400 or UAH 300,000, depending on what the customer builds with it.
Three features of the wartime regime turn a classification error into a financial one.
The fee is paid before the decision
Proof of payment is filed with the application, not after approval. The State Export Control Service then has thirty days to grant or refuse, on any of seven statutory grounds.
Resolution No. 875 is silent on refunds. The standing rules on administrative charges in this field are not silent, and what they say is unhelpful: fees paid for documents that go unused are not returned, and where a contract value is reduced by amendment, the fee is not adjusted down.
An exporter can therefore pay several million hryvnia, be refused, and find no stated mechanism for recovering it. Where the sums run to millions, this is not a compliance footnote. It is the first thing to allocate in the contract.
The fee base is not yours to calculate
The percentage attaches not to your contract price but to the price at which Ukrainian defence procurement authorities buy the goods. Where the state has not bought anything comparable in the preceding six months, valuation passes to a forensic expert opinion or a certified valuation report, valid for six months.
The base is a figure the exporter does not set, may not see, and cannot verify in advance. Pricing a contract before the valuation exists is pricing against an unknown.
The onward sale is taxed too
Where technology is transferred under the regime and goods are then manufactured abroad using it, a further 20% of the value of those goods is payable if they are exported onward to a third country.
In substance this is a royalty, written into an export control instrument rather than into the licence. It has to be modelled when the technology transfer is negotiated, not discovered when the first onward sale is booked. The intellectual property architecture underneath it is a separate question (→ Technology Transfer and R&D Investment).
Article 333, and why the file matters more than the argument
Article 333 of the Criminal Code carries a fine of two to five thousand statutory units, restriction of liberty for up to three years, or imprisonment for the same term, with disqualification from office. Repeat offences and those committed by an organised group carry up to five years — and there, disqualification is no longer optional. Investigation sits exclusively with the Security Service.
The provision is blanket in form. To establish the offence, the investigation turns to the export control legislation — and to your documents. Ukrainian criminal law doctrine has traditionally treated the subjective element of this offence as direct intent: awareness that the transfer breaches the control regime, and the will to proceed regardless.
That is usually where relief sets in. It should not.
The question is not whether you had intent. The question is what the file will say about it a year from now, when an investigator reads your correspondence and asks why you did not establish the end use when you were in a position to.
A documented identification process — written determinations, enquiries to the counterparty, retained correspondence — is not a guarantee. It is the difference between a matter closed at the investigation stage and a matter defended at trial. It is built before the goods move. Built afterwards, it is reconstruction, and it reads as such.
The Ukrainian and EU lists have drifted
This is the exposure foreign suppliers most often fail to price.
Ukraineʼs Unified List of Dual-Use Goods was built on the architecture of EU Regulation 428/2009 and introduced domestically in 2018 as an alignment measure. Its content was last brought into line with the plenary decisions of the Wassenaar Arrangement, the MTCR, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, and the Australia Group taken in 2017–2019.
The EU has since replaced 428/2009 with Regulation 2021/821, which lets the European Commission amend Annex I by delegated act. The Commission uses that power regularly; the most recent amendment took effect in September 2025.
Two mechanisms running at different speeds. One moves by delegated act in Brussels. The other requires a full Cabinet resolution in Kyiv.
The divergence is structural, not accidental. An entry added to EU Annex I after 2019 may have no Ukrainian counterpart. An item cleared as uncontrolled in Ukraine may be controlled in the EU. It runs the other way as well. Parallel classification is not belt-and-braces; it is the only way to know what you are holding.
The clearest gap is cyber-surveillance. Regulation 2021/821 introduced controls on cyber-surveillance items — a category absent from 428/2009 and therefore absent from the Ukrainian Unified List. A draft replacement of the 2003 Ukrainian statute, published by the authority for consultation in February 2026, defines the category for the first time in Ukrainian law. Until something like it passes, companies moving monitoring, extraction, or data-analysis capability to or from Ukraine are working in a space the Ukrainian list does not yet describe (→ Data Protection and Digital Compliance).
Scope of services
Regime determination
- Classification against the Unified List of Dual-Use Goods and the Military Goods List
- Assessment of whether Resolution No. 875 applies — codification and acceptance-into-service status of the end product
- Classification opinion letters for counterparties, banks, and insurers
- Reclassification review where a prior determination may be unsafe
Multi-regime classification
- Parallel classification under EU Regulation 2021/821 and the US Commerce Control List
- Identification of items controlled in one jurisdiction and not the other
- De minimis content and foreign direct product analysis where US-origin technology sits in the chain
- Licence exception strategy under the EAR and the EU general authorisations
- Intangible transfers — technical data, source code, remote access, cloud-hosted capability
- Re-export analysis for items previously imported into Ukraine
Deemed exports and the Ukrainian engineer
- Deemed export analysis for foreign nationals on controlled projects
- Technology control plans and access segregation
- Licence and exception strategy where segregation is not commercially workable
Sanctions screening
- Counterparty screening against Ukrainian, EU, US, and UN designations
- Beneficial ownership and control analysis, including the aggressor-state control test the wartime regime imposes on foreign participants
- Diversion risk and red flag review
Contractual structuring
- The information covenant — mechanisms to establish end-use and codification status from a counterparty with no obvious reason to disclose it
- Allocation of permit fee risk between supplier and buyer
- Export control representations, warranties, and compliance covenants
- End-user undertakings and onward transfer restrictions
- Export control diligence in M&A and investment
On deemed exports. Ukrainian nationals on US and EU engineering teams are ordinary. The export control consequence is not. Under EAR §734.13(b), releasing controlled technology to a foreign national inside the United States is deemed an export to that personʼs country of nationality. Nothing ships. The obligation arises from the access — a screen shared, a specification read, a design review attended.
Two qualifications matter, and both cut in the clientʼs favour. The rule does not reach US citizens, permanent residents, or protected individuals under 8 U.S.C. §1324b(a)(3). And a deemed export is not automatically a licence requirement: the technology may be EAR99, may fall within a licence exception, or may qualify as fundamental research under §734.8. The exposure is narrower than the alarm suggests. Which is precisely why it tends to be either ignored or over-corrected, and both are expensive.
How we work
Four stages, typically ninety days end to end — sixty for identification, thirty for the permit. The first two stages decide the money.
Stage 1 — Regime determination. We classify the item against the Unified List and the Military Goods List, and establish whether the end product carries codification or acceptance-into-service status. This is the difference between a fixed fee and a percentage of value, and it is settled before anything is priced.
Stage 2 — Parallel classification and fee modelling. We run the item against EU Annex I and the US CCL, identify divergences, and — where the wartime regime applies — model the fee base against defence procurement pricing, or commission the valuation the regime requires where no comparable exists.
Stage 3 — Screening and structuring. Counterparty ownership and control against the designation lists and the aggressor-state test. Then the contract: information covenants, fee allocation, end-use undertakings, IP carve-outs.
Stage 4 — Identification and permit. We take the item through preliminary identification at the State Export Control Service and prepare the permit application. Where the file moves into the wartime procedural track, it passes to the procurement side of the practice with the classification already settled.
One point on timing, because clients lose quarters to it. The published review period for a permit under Resolution No. 875 is thirty calendar days, and those thirty days run from a complete application. Preliminary identification of the goods was not abolished by the new regime and can run to sixty. Start the identification.
Who we work with
We act as Ukrainian local counsel on export control and dual-use matters, usually alongside an international lead firm or an in-house compliance function. Classification and sanctions analysis have been part of our cross-border contract and aviation finance work for years. The wartime regime is new. The analytical discipline is not.
Our clients include:
- Component and equipment suppliers into Ukrainian manufacturing, who need the regime settled before the contract is priced
- Technology companies licensing software or moving technical data to Ukrainian counterparties
- Companies with Ukrainian nationals on controlled R&D projects in the US or EU
- Investors and funds running export control diligence on Ukrainian technology assets
- International firms needing Ukrainian classification input on a cross-border deal
Typical situations:
- A European supplier has shipped components into Ukraine for two years. The customerʼs product has since been codified. Nobody has revisited the export control position — and the next shipment is not the same transaction as the last one.
- A US company licenses software to a Ukrainian entity and has Ukrainian engineers on the development team in California. Two distinct EAR exposures; neither identified.
- A supplier cannot get its Ukrainian customer to confirm the codification status of the end product, and needs the contract to solve what the regulation will not.
- A fund is acquiring a Ukrainian hardware company and needs to know whether the targetʼs export position survives diligence.
Key experts
Doctor of Laws — Cross-border technology transaction structuring; export control exposure in investment and M&A
Regulatory compliance; Ukrainian export control law; dual-use classification; sanctions screening; State Export Control Service interaction
Enforcement proceedings, administrative challenge, and litigation in the Ukrainian administrative and commercial courts
FAQ: Export Control and Dual-Use Technologies in Ukraine
My component is on the Unified List. Do I pay 30%?
Not necessarily — and the answer turns on your customer, not your part. The wartime regime reaches a listed dual-use item only where it can be used to develop, produce, or operate a military product accepted into service or codified as a supply item. If your component goes into a civilian product, or into a military product that has not been codified, the standard regime applies and the fee is the fixed scale. If it goes into a codified item, the fee is 30% of value, with no minimum contract threshold. Establishing which is the case is the first thing we do.
What if my customer will not tell me what the component goes into?
This is the practical core of the problem, and it is contractual before it is regulatory. The regime attaches a large financial consequence to a fact held by the counterparty. We draft information covenants, end-use undertakings, and fee allocation clauses that put the burden — and the cost — where the knowledge sits.
Is the permit fee refundable if the application is refused?
Resolution No. 875 does not provide for a refund. The standing rules on administrative charges state that fees paid for unused documents are not returned, and that a reduction in contract value does not trigger an adjustment. Payment is filed with the application; refusal is available on seven grounds. Allocate this in the contract.
An item is uncontrolled in the EU. Is it uncontrolled in Ukraine?
Not reliably. The Ukrainian Unified List derives from EU Regulation 428/2009 and was last substantively aligned with multilateral regime decisions from 2017–2019. The EU has since moved to Regulation 2021/821 and amends Annex I by delegated act, most recently in September 2025. Entries added on either side since divergence have no automatic counterpart on the other. Both lists have to be run. This is where parallel classification earns its keep.
If we misclassify in good faith, is that a criminal matter?
Ukrainian criminal law doctrine has traditionally treated the subjective element of Article 333 as direct intent. But that is not the answer that helps you. Intent is established by the investigation, after the fact, from your documents. If there is no written enquiry to the counterparty about end use, no written identification determination, no retained correspondence, then the absence of intent has to be argued orally, against the file. Good faith also does not displace administrative liability, confiscation of the goods, or revocation of permits. The practical answer is to build the record before the goods move. It is the only defence that works, and it cannot be built later.
Does Ukrainian export control catch software and intangible transfers?
Yes. Technical data, software, and know-how transmitted electronically fall within the regime. Emailing a specification, granting remote access to controlled software, or hosting controlled capability in the cloud can each be a controlled transfer. The border is not the test.
We have Ukrainian engineers in our US office. Does that create an export?
Possibly. Under EAR §734.13(b), releasing controlled technology to a foreign national inside the United States is deemed an export to their country of nationality — no shipment required. But the rule does not reach US citizens, permanent residents, or protected individuals, and a deemed export is not automatically a licence requirement: the technology may be EAR99, covered by a licence exception, or fundamental research. The answer is narrower than the question implies, which is exactly why it gets mishandled in both directions.
Before you contact us
- What is the item? Product, software, or technical data — function, key specifications, and any prior classification.
- Do you know what it goes into? The codification status of the end product is the single fact that sets the regime. If you do not know it, say so. That is not a gap in your instructions; it is the problem.
- Which direction, which jurisdictions? Export from Ukraine, import to Ukraine, re-export, intangible transfer. Origin of the technology, nationality of the parties, location of any US or EU content.
- Is there a deadline? Identification can run to sixty days before the thirty-day permit clock starts. Early engagement is not a courtesy here.
Regulatory framework
- Law of Ukraine No. 549-IV “On State Control over International Transfers of Military and Dual-Use Goods” (2003, as amended)
- CMU Resolution No. 875 of 1 July 2026 — wartime procedure for international transfers of military and dual-use goods; in force 8 July 2026
- CMU Resolution No. 86 of 28 January 2004 — dual-use control procedure; annexes the Unified List of Dual-Use Goods
- CMU Resolution No. 1807 of 20 November 2003 — military goods control procedure; annexes the Military Goods List
- CMU Resolution No. 746 of 13 July 2011 — schedule of administrative charges in the export control field
- Criminal Code of Ukraine, Article 333
- Code of Ukraine on Administrative Offences, Articles 188-17 and 212-4
- Regulation (EU) 2021/821 — EU dual-use regime; Annex I as amended by delegated act
- US Export Administration Regulations — Commerce Control List; §734.13(b) deemed exports; §734.4 de minimis; §734.9 foreign direct product
- Wassenaar Arrangement, Australia Group, MTCR, Nuclear Suppliers Group
- State Export Control Service of Ukraine — dsecu.gov.ua
Related practices
Ready to proceed?
We will settle which regime applies to your technology, model what it costs, and structure the transaction around the answer.