Dual-Use Technologies and Export Control in Ukraine

Not necessarily — and the answer turns on your customer, not your part. The wartime regime reaches a listed dual-use item only where it can be used to develop, produce, or operate a military product accepted into service or codified as a supply item. If your component goes into a civilian product, or into a military product that has not been codified, the standard regime applies and the fee is the fixed scale. If it goes into a codified item, the fee is 30% of value, with no minimum contract threshold. Establishing which is the case is the first thing we do.

This is the practical core of the problem, and it is contractual before it is regulatory. The regime attaches a large financial consequence to a fact held by the counterparty. We draft information covenants, end-use undertakings, and fee allocation clauses that put the burden — and the cost — where the knowledge sits.

Resolution No. 875 does not provide for a refund. The standing rules on administrative charges state that fees paid for unused documents are not returned, and that a reduction in contract value does not trigger an adjustment. Payment is filed with the application; refusal is available on seven statutory grounds. Allocate this in the contract.

Not reliably. The Ukrainian Unified List derives from EU Regulation 428/2009 and was last substantively aligned with multilateral regime decisions from 2017–2019. The EU has since moved to Regulation 2021/821 and amends Annex I by delegated act, most recently in September 2025. Entries added on either side since divergence have no automatic counterpart on the other. Both lists have to be run — this is where parallel classification earns its keep.

Ukrainian criminal law doctrine has traditionally treated the subjective element of Article 333 as direct intent. But intent is established by the investigation, after the fact, from your documents. If there is no written enquiry to the counterparty about end use, no written identification determination, no retained correspondence — the absence of intent has to be argued orally, against the file. Good faith also does not displace administrative liability, confiscation, or revocation of permits. Build the record before the goods move; it cannot be built later.

Yes. Technical data, software, and know-how transmitted electronically fall within the regime. Emailing a specification, granting remote access to controlled software, or hosting controlled capability in the cloud can each be a controlled transfer. The border is not the test.

Possibly. Under EAR §734.13(b), releasing controlled technology to a foreign national inside the United States is deemed an export to their country of nationality — no shipment required. But the rule does not reach US citizens, permanent residents, or protected individuals, and a deemed export is not automatically a licence requirement: the technology may be EAR99, covered by a licence exception, or fundamental research. The answer is narrower than the question implies — which is exactly why it gets mishandled in both directions.

Not yet as a category. EU Regulation 2021/821 introduced controls on cyber-surveillance items — a category absent from the older regulation the Ukrainian Unified List was built on, and therefore absent from the List. A draft replacement of the 2003 statute, published for consultation in February 2026, defines the category for the first time in Ukrainian law. Until it passes, monitoring, extraction, and data-analysis capability moves in a space the Ukrainian list does not yet describe — which makes contractual protections and EU-side analysis carry the weight.