Reference Author: Anna Tsirat Download PDF Share

Recent changes

  • Denmark: the Government approved a draft agreement on the exchange and mutual protection of restricted information and authorised the SBU to sign it (Order No. 629-r)
  • Canada: agreement entered into force
  • Canada: agreement ratified (Law No. 4801-IX)
  • Japan: Agreement on Security of Information entered into force
  • Japan: Agreement on Security of Information ratified (Law No. 4368-IX)

When a foreign partner, licensee or investor needs access to classified Ukrainian technology, Ukrainian law allows it only in exceptional cases: under an international treaty to which the Verkhovna Rada has given its consent, or by written order of the President (Article 27(7) of the Law of Ukraine on State Secrets). The same rule governs transfers of classified information to a foreign state (Article 32). The treaties in question are security of information agreements, called in Ukrainian law agreements on the mutual protection of restricted information.

Ukraine has them with NATO, the EU and 47 states (as of November 2026). This page collects them in one place and shows what matters to counsel structuring a transaction: whether an agreement covers contracts with industry, how visits are arranged and how much lead time they need. A consolidated list is also available on the website of the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU), the competent authority on the Ukrainian side; it names 46 states and leaves out Hungary, but the Verkhovna Rada record shows the agreement with Hungary in force, so we count it.

Elsewhere these instruments go by other names: a General Security of Information Agreement (GSOIA) or Security of Information Agreement (SOIA) in US and NATO practice, often supplemented by an Industrial Security Annex covering contractors. Ukraine’s 2024 security agreement with Belgium itself uses the term GSOIA for the agreement the parties intend to conclude.

Before relying on an agreement

  • Ratification is required, and every agreement in the first two tables has it, even though most were concluded by governments rather than by states.
  • Not every “security agreement” qualifies. The bilateral security agreements Ukraine signed with partner states in 2024 record, on classified information, at most an intention to conclude a separate agreement, and in some cases only an undertaking to explore one. In our view, memoranda between ministries and arrangements between security authorities are not, on their own, a basis for access by foreigners either.
  • Access is arranged between states, not companies. Your client and its staff need clearances from their own state, the security requirements are written into the contract, and each visit involving access is, as a rule, approved in advance by the security authorities of both states (under some agreements, also by the establishment to be visited). Visit requests are due 10 to 30 days ahead (business days under some agreements), and many agreements allow lists of recurring visitors.
  • The agreements are not uniform. Several older agreements have no separate article on contracts with industry. Under the agreement with Japan, visits involving access are foreseen only for officials of government bodies, and contractors receive information through their own government. In our view, agreements without a contracts article are a weaker basis for an industrial joint venture, and the agreement with Japan does not provide for direct access by a Japanese company’s engineers.
  • Not all classified information is covered. The agreement with the United States covers only classified information in the field of defence, defined as information generated by or for the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine or the US Department of Defense, or under their jurisdiction or control (Art. 3); the agreement with Canada covers information relating to defence and security provided in the context of industrial security or defence (Art. 2(1)). In our view, technology developed neither for nor under the control of a defence ministry may fall outside the US agreement.
  • The agreements treat classification levels differently. On the Ukrainian side the agreement with Japan covers only the levels Osoblyvoi vazhlyvosti (Top Secret), Tsilkom taiemno (Secret) and Taiemno (Confidential) (Art. 4), so information marked Dlia sluzhbovoho korystuvannia (For Official Use Only) falls outside it. Under the agreement with Canada, a request for a visit involving access to information classified Taiemno/CONFIDENTIAL or above is submitted through the visitor’s own security authority (Art. 14(1)(b)).
  • No agreement guarantees access. None obliges a state to share information, and information received may be passed to third parties only with the written consent of the state that provided it. In our view, this means that your client’s affiliate in a third country does not obtain access automatically.
  • Where there is no agreement, access requires a written order of the President. In our view, this currently applies to Denmark, despite the scale of Danish–Ukrainian co-production.
  • An agreement is not an export licence. Transferring military or dual-use goods, technology or services to a foreign partner requires a separate permit from the State Export Control Service under the Law on State Control over International Transfers of Military and Dual-Use Goods, whether or not a security of information agreement is in place. The agreement governs how information is protected, not whether it may be transferred.

NATO, the EU, EU and NATO member states and other partners

“Contracts with industry” gives the article governing contracts with companies. “Visits” gives the article on visits and, where the agreement sets one, the lead time for a visit request. Article numbers refer to the Ukrainian texts of the agreements. For the agreements of recent years, the “Ratification” column also gives the date of entry into force, taken from the partner state’s official publication: the gap between ratification and the exchange of notifications has ranged from five weeks to more than a year and a half.

PartyAgreement, date signedRatificationContracts with industryVisits
NATOSecurity Agreement, 13 Mar 1995; Administrative Arrangements, 28 Sep 2016Law No. 160-IV of 12 Sep 2002; Law No. 2068-VIII of 24 May 2017— (exchange with NATO as an organisation)—
European UnionAgreement on security procedures, 13 Jun 2005Law No. 499-V of 20 Dec 2006— (exchange with EU institutions)—
Albania5 Feb 2008Law No. 638-VI of 30 Oct 2008Art. 6(2)–(4), within “Security measures”: classified contracts, security annexArt. 8
Bulgaria21 May 2004Law No. 2828-IV of 7 Sep 2005Art. 10Art. 11
Canada3 Dec 2024Law No. 4801-IX of 26 Feb 2026
Arts. 9–11Art. 14; 30 business days; recurring visits (Art. 14(2))
Croatia14 Jul 2005Law No. 34-V of 26 Jul 2006no separate articleArt. 6
Cyprus4 Jul 2011Law No. 4098-VI of 9 Dec 2011no separate articleArt. 8
Czech Republic14 May 2003Law No. 1987-IV of 8 Sep 2004Art. 5, within “Security measures”: classified contracts and subcontracts, security annexArt. 8; three weeks; recurring lists
Estonia10 May 2004; amended 2 Dec 2010Law No. 2827-IV of 7 Sep 2005; amendments: Law No. 4424-VI of 22 Feb 2012Art. 9Art. 8, usually through diplomatic channels; lists for recurring visits
Finland12 Sep 2019Law No. 1824-IX of 21 Oct 2021
Art. 6Art. 9; 14 days; recurring visits up to 12 months
France7 Dec 1999Law No. 2602-III of 5 Jul 2001Art. 10, including subcontracts; preamble: tenders and contracts of organisations whatever their ownershipArt. 9; 20 days; recurring lists up to 12 months
Germany29 May 1998Law No. 2937-III of 10 Jan 2002Arts. 4–5Art. 8
GreeceDefence, 6 Oct 2011Law No. 5436-VI of 16 Oct 2012no separate article; para. 6.3: security obligations to be set out in the organisations’ contractsArt. 5; recurring lists
Hungary15 Nov 2006; the Verkhovna Rada record shows it in force; it is not in the list of agreements in force on the SBU website (November 2026)Law No. 131-VI of 6 Mar 2008Art. 9Art. 8
Italy6 Jun 2001Law No. 2941-III of 10 Jan 2002Art. 7: security measures agreed case by caseArt. 10
JapanSecurity of information, 16 Nov 2024Law No. 4368-IX of 17 Apr 2025
Art. 16: through the receiving PartyArt. 8: officials of government bodies only
Korea, Republic ofMilitary classified information, 11 Apr 2003Law No. 2826-IV of 7 Sep 2005no separate articleArt. 11; three weeks; diplomatic or military channels; recurring visits up to 12 months
Latvia7 Nov 2003Law No. 2126-IV of 22 Oct 2004Art. 8Art. 9
Lithuania5 Jun 2003Law No. 1761-IV of 4 Jun 2004Art. 5Art. 8; 10 business days, request to the establishment to be visited; recurring visits up to 12 months
Netherlands5 Feb 2024Law No. 3824-IX of 19 Jun 2024
Art. 8Art. 11; 10 days; recurring lists
North Macedonia29 Jun 2009Law No. 2842-VI of 22 Dec 2010Art. 5Art. 8
Norway12 Sep 2006Law No. 636-VI of 30 Oct 2008Art. 8Art. 7; three weeks
Poland27 Aug 2015Law No. 1536-VIII of 21 Sep 2016Art. 6; mutual recognition of clearances: Art. 5Art. 10; 30 days; recurring lists
Portugal22 May 2017Law No. 2283-VIII of 8 Feb 2018Art. 11Art. 12; 30 days (7 if urgent); recurring lists for 12 months
Romania22 Oct 2013Law No. 565-VIII of 1 Jul 2015Art. 8Art. 7; 20 business days (5 if urgent)
Slovakia22 Jun 2006Law No. 567-VI of 19 Sep 2008Arts. 5(1), 5(3) and 8(3): clearance of the legal entity before transfer, security measures in contractsArt. 7
Slovenia4 Jun 2008Law No. 1217-VI of 1 Apr 2009Art. 10Art. 9; 20 days (5 if urgent); recurring lists
Spain10 Feb 2015Law No. 941-VIII of 27 Jan 2016Art. 8Art. 7; 30 days (10 if urgent)
Sweden12 Jul 2023Law No. 3433-IX of 8 Nov 2023
Art. 11Art. 10, including contractors’ staff
TurkeyDefence industry, 23 Nov 2000Law No. 2604-III of 5 Jul 2001Art. 13: a security annex drawn up by the originating Party for every contract and subcontract involving classified information; clearance of organisations — Art. 10(2)Art. 14; 25 days
United KingdomMemorandum of Understanding (defence), 6 Sep 2004; amending protocolLaw No. 686-VI of 17 Dec 2008; protocol: Law No. 1098-IX of 16 Dec 2020Art. 8Art. 9, through diplomatic channels; lists of recurring visitors up to 12 months
United StatesDefence, 4 Aug 2003Law No. 1760-IV of 4 Jun 2004Art. 19 (contractors)requests through defence attachés

Other states

States with no agreement in force

As of the date of this update, we have found no published agreement in force with the following states:

StateWhat is known
DenmarkThe Cabinet of Ministers approved a draft Agreement on the exchange and mutual protection of restricted information in the field of defence and the defence industry and authorised the SBU to sign it (Order No. 629-r of 24 June 2026). The political Agreement on Enhanced Defence and Security Cooperation of 7 July 2026 (para. 50) refers the exchange of classified information to “the relevant agreements and arrangements” on its mutual protection.
QatarThe Cabinet of Ministers approved a draft Agreement on the mutual protection of restricted information (Order No. 518-r of 24 June 2022; the person authorised to sign was changed in 2023 and on 27 March 2026). According to the list on the SBU website (November 2026), the agreement is going through the domestic procedures required for its entry into force; the date of signature has not been published and we have found no ratification law.
BrazilAccording to the list on the SBU website (November 2026), Brazil is among the states with which “measures are being taken to prepare the relevant agreements”.
BelgiumAuthority to sign was granted by Presidential Order No. 41/2016-rp of 23 February 2016; the security agreement of 28 May 2024 (para. 37) records that the parties “will strive to conclude” a General Security of Information Agreement (GSOIA).
IcelandThe security agreement of 31 May 2024 (para. 36) records an intention to conclude a mutual protection agreement.
LuxembourgThe security agreement of 10 July 2024 (para. 30) goes no further than exploring the possibility of such an agreement.
IrelandThe Agreement on Support for Ukraine and Cooperation of 4 September 2024 provides only for exploring mechanisms for exchanging information.
Austria, Malta, Montenegro, Australia, SwitzerlandNo agreement found.

How we can help

We act as Ukrainian counsel alongside the client’s lead firm in structuring access to classified Ukrainian technology, from identifying the applicable agreement to the security terms of the contract and the approvals. See our pages on dual-use technologies and export control and defence technology and military procurement.

If you know of an agreement that is not yet listed, let us know and we will update the page.

This page is not legal advice. Information as of 19 November 2026; sources are the texts of the agreements and the ratification laws in Ukraine’s official legislation databases.