Recent changes
- Denmark: the Government approved a draft agreement on the exchange and mutual protection of restricted information and authorised the SBU to sign it (Order No. 629-r)
- Canada: agreement entered into force
- Canada: agreement ratified (Law No. 4801-IX)
- Japan: Agreement on Security of Information entered into force
- Japan: Agreement on Security of Information ratified (Law No. 4368-IX)
When a foreign partner, licensee or investor needs access to classified Ukrainian technology, Ukrainian law allows it only in exceptional cases: under an international treaty to which the Verkhovna Rada has given its consent, or by written order of the President (Article 27(7) of the Law of Ukraine on State Secrets). The same rule governs transfers of classified information to a foreign state (Article 32). The treaties in question are security of information agreements, called in Ukrainian law agreements on the mutual protection of restricted information.
Ukraine has them with NATO, the EU and 47 states (as of November 2026). This page collects them in one place and shows what matters to counsel structuring a transaction: whether an agreement covers contracts with industry, how visits are arranged and how much lead time they need. A consolidated list is also available on the website of the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU), the competent authority on the Ukrainian side; it names 46 states and leaves out Hungary, but the Verkhovna Rada record shows the agreement with Hungary in force, so we count it.
Elsewhere these instruments go by other names: a General Security of Information Agreement (GSOIA) or Security of Information Agreement (SOIA) in US and NATO practice, often supplemented by an Industrial Security Annex covering contractors. Ukraine’s 2024 security agreement with Belgium itself uses the term GSOIA for the agreement the parties intend to conclude.
Before relying on an agreement
- Ratification is required, and every agreement in the first two tables has it, even though most were concluded by governments rather than by states.
- Not every “security agreement” qualifies. The bilateral security agreements Ukraine signed with partner states in 2024 record, on classified information, at most an intention to conclude a separate agreement, and in some cases only an undertaking to explore one. In our view, memoranda between ministries and arrangements between security authorities are not, on their own, a basis for access by foreigners either.
- Access is arranged between states, not companies. Your client and its staff need clearances from their own state, the security requirements are written into the contract, and each visit involving access is, as a rule, approved in advance by the security authorities of both states (under some agreements, also by the establishment to be visited). Visit requests are due 10 to 30 days ahead (business days under some agreements), and many agreements allow lists of recurring visitors.
- The agreements are not uniform. Several older agreements have no separate article on contracts with industry. Under the agreement with Japan, visits involving access are foreseen only for officials of government bodies, and contractors receive information through their own government. In our view, agreements without a contracts article are a weaker basis for an industrial joint venture, and the agreement with Japan does not provide for direct access by a Japanese company’s engineers.
- Not all classified information is covered. The agreement with the United States covers only classified information in the field of defence, defined as information generated by or for the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine or the US Department of Defense, or under their jurisdiction or control (Art. 3); the agreement with Canada covers information relating to defence and security provided in the context of industrial security or defence (Art. 2(1)). In our view, technology developed neither for nor under the control of a defence ministry may fall outside the US agreement.
- The agreements treat classification levels differently. On the Ukrainian side the agreement with Japan covers only the levels Osoblyvoi vazhlyvosti (Top Secret), Tsilkom taiemno (Secret) and Taiemno (Confidential) (Art. 4), so information marked Dlia sluzhbovoho korystuvannia (For Official Use Only) falls outside it. Under the agreement with Canada, a request for a visit involving access to information classified Taiemno/CONFIDENTIAL or above is submitted through the visitor’s own security authority (Art. 14(1)(b)).
- No agreement guarantees access. None obliges a state to share information, and information received may be passed to third parties only with the written consent of the state that provided it. In our view, this means that your client’s affiliate in a third country does not obtain access automatically.
- Where there is no agreement, access requires a written order of the President. In our view, this currently applies to Denmark, despite the scale of Danish–Ukrainian co-production.
- An agreement is not an export licence. Transferring military or dual-use goods, technology or services to a foreign partner requires a separate permit from the State Export Control Service under the Law on State Control over International Transfers of Military and Dual-Use Goods, whether or not a security of information agreement is in place. The agreement governs how information is protected, not whether it may be transferred.
NATO, the EU, EU and NATO member states and other partners
“Contracts with industry” gives the article governing contracts with companies. “Visits” gives the article on visits and, where the agreement sets one, the lead time for a visit request. Article numbers refer to the Ukrainian texts of the agreements. For the agreements of recent years, the “Ratification” column also gives the date of entry into force, taken from the partner state’s official publication: the gap between ratification and the exchange of notifications has ranged from five weeks to more than a year and a half.
- NATO
- European Union
- Albania
- Bulgaria
- Canada
- Croatia
- Cyprus
- Czech Republic
- Estonia
- Finland
- France
- Germany
- Greece
- Hungary
- Italy
- Japan
- Korea, Republic of
- Latvia
- Lithuania
- Netherlands
- North Macedonia
- Norway
- Poland
- Portugal
- Romania
- Slovakia
- Slovenia
- Spain
- Sweden
- Turkey
- United Kingdom
- United States
| Party | Agreement, date signed | Ratification | Contracts with industry | Visits |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| NATO | Security Agreement, 13 Mar 1995; Administrative Arrangements, 28 Sep 2016 | Law No. 160-IV of 12 Sep 2002; Law No. 2068-VIII of 24 May 2017 | — (exchange with NATO as an organisation) | — |
| European Union | Agreement on security procedures, 13 Jun 2005 | Law No. 499-V of 20 Dec 2006 | — (exchange with EU institutions) | — |
| Albania | 5 Feb 2008 | Law No. 638-VI of 30 Oct 2008 | Art. 6(2)–(4), within “Security measures”: classified contracts, security annex | Art. 8 |
| Bulgaria | 21 May 2004 | Law No. 2828-IV of 7 Sep 2005 | Art. 10 | Art. 11 |
| Canada | 3 Dec 2024 | Law No. 4801-IX of 26 Feb 2026 | Arts. 9–11 | Art. 14; 30 business days; recurring visits (Art. 14(2)) |
| Croatia | 14 Jul 2005 | Law No. 34-V of 26 Jul 2006 | no separate article | Art. 6 |
| Cyprus | 4 Jul 2011 | Law No. 4098-VI of 9 Dec 2011 | no separate article | Art. 8 |
| Czech Republic | 14 May 2003 | Law No. 1987-IV of 8 Sep 2004 | Art. 5, within “Security measures”: classified contracts and subcontracts, security annex | Art. 8; three weeks; recurring lists |
| Estonia | 10 May 2004; amended 2 Dec 2010 | Law No. 2827-IV of 7 Sep 2005; amendments: Law No. 4424-VI of 22 Feb 2012 | Art. 9 | Art. 8, usually through diplomatic channels; lists for recurring visits |
| Finland | 12 Sep 2019 | Law No. 1824-IX of 21 Oct 2021 | Art. 6 | Art. 9; 14 days; recurring visits up to 12 months |
| France | 7 Dec 1999 | Law No. 2602-III of 5 Jul 2001 | Art. 10, including subcontracts; preamble: tenders and contracts of organisations whatever their ownership | Art. 9; 20 days; recurring lists up to 12 months |
| Germany | 29 May 1998 | Law No. 2937-III of 10 Jan 2002 | Arts. 4–5 | Art. 8 |
| Greece | Defence, 6 Oct 2011 | Law No. 5436-VI of 16 Oct 2012 | no separate article; para. 6.3: security obligations to be set out in the organisations’ contracts | Art. 5; recurring lists |
| Hungary | 15 Nov 2006; the Verkhovna Rada record shows it in force; it is not in the list of agreements in force on the SBU website (November 2026) | Law No. 131-VI of 6 Mar 2008 | Art. 9 | Art. 8 |
| Italy | 6 Jun 2001 | Law No. 2941-III of 10 Jan 2002 | Art. 7: security measures agreed case by case | Art. 10 |
| Japan | Security of information, 16 Nov 2024 | Law No. 4368-IX of 17 Apr 2025 | Art. 16: through the receiving Party | Art. 8: officials of government bodies only |
| Korea, Republic of | Military classified information, 11 Apr 2003 | Law No. 2826-IV of 7 Sep 2005 | no separate article | Art. 11; three weeks; diplomatic or military channels; recurring visits up to 12 months |
| Latvia | 7 Nov 2003 | Law No. 2126-IV of 22 Oct 2004 | Art. 8 | Art. 9 |
| Lithuania | 5 Jun 2003 | Law No. 1761-IV of 4 Jun 2004 | Art. 5 | Art. 8; 10 business days, request to the establishment to be visited; recurring visits up to 12 months |
| Netherlands | 5 Feb 2024 | Law No. 3824-IX of 19 Jun 2024 | Art. 8 | Art. 11; 10 days; recurring lists |
| North Macedonia | 29 Jun 2009 | Law No. 2842-VI of 22 Dec 2010 | Art. 5 | Art. 8 |
| Norway | 12 Sep 2006 | Law No. 636-VI of 30 Oct 2008 | Art. 8 | Art. 7; three weeks |
| Poland | 27 Aug 2015 | Law No. 1536-VIII of 21 Sep 2016 | Art. 6; mutual recognition of clearances: Art. 5 | Art. 10; 30 days; recurring lists |
| Portugal | 22 May 2017 | Law No. 2283-VIII of 8 Feb 2018 | Art. 11 | Art. 12; 30 days (7 if urgent); recurring lists for 12 months |
| Romania | 22 Oct 2013 | Law No. 565-VIII of 1 Jul 2015 | Art. 8 | Art. 7; 20 business days (5 if urgent) |
| Slovakia | 22 Jun 2006 | Law No. 567-VI of 19 Sep 2008 | Arts. 5(1), 5(3) and 8(3): clearance of the legal entity before transfer, security measures in contracts | Art. 7 |
| Slovenia | 4 Jun 2008 | Law No. 1217-VI of 1 Apr 2009 | Art. 10 | Art. 9; 20 days (5 if urgent); recurring lists |
| Spain | 10 Feb 2015 | Law No. 941-VIII of 27 Jan 2016 | Art. 8 | Art. 7; 30 days (10 if urgent) |
| Sweden | 12 Jul 2023 | Law No. 3433-IX of 8 Nov 2023 | Art. 11 | Art. 10, including contractors’ staff |
| Turkey | Defence industry, 23 Nov 2000 | Law No. 2604-III of 5 Jul 2001 | Art. 13: a security annex drawn up by the originating Party for every contract and subcontract involving classified information; clearance of organisations — Art. 10(2) | Art. 14; 25 days |
| United Kingdom | Memorandum of Understanding (defence), 6 Sep 2004; amending protocol | Law No. 686-VI of 17 Dec 2008; protocol: Law No. 1098-IX of 16 Dec 2020 | Art. 8 | Art. 9, through diplomatic channels; lists of recurring visitors up to 12 months |
| United States | Defence, 4 Aug 2003 | Law No. 1760-IV of 4 Jun 2004 | Art. 19 (contractors) | requests through defence attachés |
Other states
States with no agreement in force
As of the date of this update, we have found no published agreement in force with the following states:
| State | What is known |
|---|---|
| Denmark | The Cabinet of Ministers approved a draft Agreement on the exchange and mutual protection of restricted information in the field of defence and the defence industry and authorised the SBU to sign it (Order No. 629-r of 24 June 2026). The political Agreement on Enhanced Defence and Security Cooperation of 7 July 2026 (para. 50) refers the exchange of classified information to “the relevant agreements and arrangements” on its mutual protection. |
| Qatar | The Cabinet of Ministers approved a draft Agreement on the mutual protection of restricted information (Order No. 518-r of 24 June 2022; the person authorised to sign was changed in 2023 and on 27 March 2026). According to the list on the SBU website (November 2026), the agreement is going through the domestic procedures required for its entry into force; the date of signature has not been published and we have found no ratification law. |
| Brazil | According to the list on the SBU website (November 2026), Brazil is among the states with which “measures are being taken to prepare the relevant agreements”. |
| Belgium | Authority to sign was granted by Presidential Order No. 41/2016-rp of 23 February 2016; the security agreement of 28 May 2024 (para. 37) records that the parties “will strive to conclude” a General Security of Information Agreement (GSOIA). |
| Iceland | The security agreement of 31 May 2024 (para. 36) records an intention to conclude a mutual protection agreement. |
| Luxembourg | The security agreement of 10 July 2024 (para. 30) goes no further than exploring the possibility of such an agreement. |
| Ireland | The Agreement on Support for Ukraine and Cooperation of 4 September 2024 provides only for exploring mechanisms for exchanging information. |
| Austria, Malta, Montenegro, Australia, Switzerland | No agreement found. |
How we can help
We act as Ukrainian counsel alongside the client’s lead firm in structuring access to classified Ukrainian technology, from identifying the applicable agreement to the security terms of the contract and the approvals. See our pages on dual-use technologies and export control and defence technology and military procurement.
If you know of an agreement that is not yet listed, let us know and we will update the page.
Related materials
This page is not legal advice. Information as of 19 November 2026; sources are the texts of the agreements and the ratification laws in Ukraine’s official legislation databases.