Airport Governance Models: Ukraine’s Path Forward

For the first time in its history, Ukraine’s civil aviation sector has been entirely suspended due to the full-scale war. Yet “suspension” does not mean “inactivity.” Behind the silence of idle runways, decisions are already being made that will shape the country’s postwar aviation landscape.

In June 2025, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and the International Finance Corporation (IFC) introduced a team of international experts and a roadmap for a comprehensive study on private sector participation in the management and maintenance of Ukrainian airports. The results of this study are expected to be submitted to the Ministry for Communities and Territories Development of Ukraine in August 2025, though not released publicly.

The research focuses on three key airports:

• • Boryspil International Airport – Ukraine’s largest airport, under state ownership

• • Lviv Danylo Halytskyi International Airport – the country’s second state-owned airport, located in Western Ukraine

• • Odesa International Airport – municipally owned and previously subject to private investment initiatives

At first glance, the choice of these three airports seems geographically and legally balanced: two are state-owned, one municipal; one in the east, one in the west, one in the south. However, beyond this formal logic likely lies a deeper strategic rationale.

Before the full-scale invasion, Boryspil served as Ukraine’s national aviation hub — the country’s primary gateway for both international and domestic flights, with potential to evolve into a regional connector for Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. But after three years of airspace closure, shifting logistics, ongoing security risks, and emerging demand centers (especially in western Ukraine), this model requires a fundamental reassessment. Including Lviv in the study, therefore, seems entirely reasonable.

The choice to include Odesa may also reflect strategic foresight. As noted in one of our previous publications, Boryspil could face significant challenges in regaining its hub status due to persistent sanctions and EASA (European Union Aviation Safety Agency) restrictions on flights over parts of Russian territory. For geographic and safety reasons, most future flight routes are likely to focus westward and southward. In this context, the potential transformation of Odesa into a regional or secondary hub is a scenario worth exploring now.

Such framing allows Ukraine to think strategically — not merely about restoring the status quo, but about developing a multipolar airport system that reflects new geopolitical and logistical realities.

⮚ TL;DR: The EBRD/IFC study focuses on three airports — two state-owned and one municipal — suggesting a broader strategic reassessment of Ukraine’s hub system. With Boryspil’s traditional role potentially weakened, exploring alternatives like Lviv and Odesa is essential. Planning for postwar recovery must begin even while airspace remains closed.

A detailed examination of Boryspil Airport reveals a systemic contrast between the government’s proactive infrastructure development paradigm and the openness to private capital typically associated with modern strategic planning.

Boryspil’s runways are in excellent technical condition, both before and throughout the full-scale war. This stems from large-scale infrastructure upgrades carried out over the past decades. Runway No. 2 was commissioned in 2001 and met all international requirements for handling wide-body long-haul aircraft at that time. Runway No. 1, the original strip, underwent a complete reconstruction between 2011 and 2013, bringing its structural capacity and surface quality in line with modern aviation standards.

Neither runway currently requires further reconstruction. Procurement notices for 2024–2025 refer only to minor maintenance of taxiways and segments of utility networks. This confirms that the aviation infrastructure needed to ensure safe aircraft operations remains fully functional. It has retained its operational value and can be rapidly reactivated once the airspace reopens.

In other words, Boryspil is not suffering from an infrastructure investment deficit—at least not at the airfield level—and the state has no urgent need to attract private capital to finance further upgrades or new construction in this part of the airport complex.

Despite the ongoing war and closed skies, Boryspil has not only maintained its infrastructure but is actively implementing large-scale projects under its 2045 Development Concept, adopted in 2019. The Concept envisions over €3.4 billion in investments, primarily from state and airport resources.

As of 2024–2025, the airport is expanding Terminal D, aiming to serve 10 million passengers by 2028. Originally, the expansion was designed for projected traffic of 27.7 million by 2030 and nearly 54 million by 2045. This raises legitimate questions about the budgetary rationale of proceeding with the project under present wartime conditions when air traffic volumes are essentially zero. Whether such a strategy aligns with sound fiscal planning remains an open issue.

In this context, Boryspil’s recent activity transcends mere asset preservation. Despite the complete suspension of passenger services, the airport has intensified its institutional efforts to modernize infrastructure, retain human capital, and implement long-term investment projects.

Over the past 18 months, Boryspil has advanced on three fronts. First, it has visibly maintained its infrastructure—terminals, runways, engineering systems, and aviation equipment. The airport has hosted delegations from Japan, South Korea, Eurocontrol, the French government, and others, all of whom have praised the facility’s readiness for postwar reactivation.

Second, the airport has significantly invested in human capital. In 2024 alone, over 2,700 aviation professionals completed training, certification, or requalification programs. ICAO platforms and CASRA certification programs remain active, and aviation security personnel continue to undergo annual testing. This creates a talent reserve that can support rapid resumption of full operations when the skies reopen.

Third, Boryspil continues to pursue infrastructure projects outlined in the 2045 Development Concept. Notably, these efforts are framed not in terms of concession, corporatization, or private operator engagement. On the contrary, the state is reinforcing its control while selectively partnering with Japanese, Korean, French, or EU actors to implement specific technological components. This suggests not a rejection of private capital but a preference for a model where the state remains the principal investor, project coordinator, and operational decision-maker.

The draft Civil Aviation Strategy to 2030 outlines corporatization as a possible pathway for Boryspil, implying a transition from a state enterprise to a joint-stock company with 100% state ownership. This would not equate to privatization but would provide legal and institutional mechanisms for investment attraction, commercial contracting, and more flexible governance. Whether this step will be taken remains to be seen.

Thus, Boryspil’s current posture is not passive or preservationist but instead reflects an active phase of preparing for postwar growth—emphasizing state-led modernization, workforce retention, and institutional capacity building. At the same time, this approach presents a challenge to potential private-sector models: can they be integrated into an existing structure that operates effectively under tight state oversight?

Continuing to implement a prewar €3.4 billion investment plan amid wartime uncertainty, a declining population, and unclear future traffic demand seems difficult to justify in light of basic fiscal principles. Moreover, Ukraine’s National Transport Strategy to 2030 explicitly calls for revising strategic documents adopted prior to the full-scale invasion. The failure to reassess Boryspil’s Development Concept appears to contradict this recommendation.

⮚ TL;DR: Boryspil Airport remains an example of a state-led development model focused on modernization, infrastructure preservation, and workforce investment. However, continuing its prewar development plan without adjustment for wartime realities raises budgetary concerns and complicates the future integration of private capital.

Unlike Boryspil Airport, which has an officially approved long-term development strategy through 2045, Lviv Airport operates without an up-to-date medium-term strategic plan. Although the Ministry of Infrastructure adopted a State Ownership Policy for the Lviv Danylo Halytskyi International Airport in 2018 (Order No. 642), the document remains largely declarative. It affirms the principle of “exclusive state ownership” without defining any investment roadmap or scenarios for private capital involvement. Despite wartime conditions and demographic shifts in the region, this policy has not been revised—neither to address functioning under exceptional circumstances, nor to explore potential institutional transformation of the enterprise.

The condition of the airport’s core infrastructure, particularly the runway, does not currently justify large-scale upgrades through traditional public-private partnerships. The airport’s sole runway was fully reconstructed in 2011 as part of Ukraine’s preparations for the Euro 2012 football championship. It remains in good technical condition, as evidenced by the absence of any tenders for major capital repairs in 2024–2025. No signs of degradation in taxiways or the apron have been reported either, making large-scale PPP projects—such as for runway reconstruction—unlikely in the short to medium term.

Despite the lack of an integrated development strategy, the government has initiated several targeted interventions, which appear to respond more to security concerns than to a coherent long-term vision. According to the national DREAM planning system, the following projects are currently underway or scheduled for 2024–2025:

• Modernization of instrument landing systems (ILS), likely to enhance flight regularity and safety under adverse weather conditions;
• Upgrades to the airport’s civil protection and aviation security infrastructure, likely in response to heightened wartime risks;
• Construction of a cargo terminal (scheduled from June 2025 to December 2027), which may indicate an attempt to diversify the airport’s business model and anticipate increased demand for freight services during postwar recovery.

These interventions, however, are not embedded within any publicly available development concept for the airport as a regional infrastructure hub. There is no evidence of coordination with potential stakeholders such as logistics companies, airport operators, or private investors. For instance, the cargo terminal project lacks a published feasibility study, business model, or user profile. It remains unclear whether the project targets transit logistics, EU import-export flows, regional sorting, or cooperation with global operators such as DHL, UPS, or FedEx.

This stands in stark contrast to Boryspil’s approach, where the corporate strategy integrates public investments with initiatives targeting strategic partners and potential concessionaires.

In the Ministry for Communities’ “Owner’s Expectations List for 2026,” the focus is placed on maintaining operational capacity, ensuring flight safety, and preserving infrastructure. This reflects a cautious maintenance posture rather than proactive development. Even the potentially transformative cargo terminal project is being implemented without integration into a formal business plan or performance indicators, thereby undermining its return on investment.

Lviv Airport’s unique location—just 70 kilometers from the EU border—makes it a natural candidate for piloting private capital involvement. But to unlock this potential, a shift is needed: from viewing the airport as a maintenance asset to managing it as a growth engine.

One critical threat to future development arises from the expansion plans of the neighboring village of Sokilnyky. The new general plan envisions residential housing for up to 14,000 residents within the airport’s noise exposure zones. According to Ukrainian health regulations, this poses risks to human well-being and is likely to trigger future complaints—potentially even legal action to restrict airport operations. This echoes the trajectory of Kyiv’s Zhulyany Airport. Despite formal objections raised by the airport operator, the plan has moved forward without proper coordination, creating both environmental and institutional uncertainty that could hinder long-term planning and investment.

Such uncoordinated local decisions not only damage the state’s reputation as a reliable partner under aviation law, but also deter both public and private investment in airport expansion. Moreover, the planned population growth in Sokilnyky—up to 50,000 residents without corresponding public transport improvements—risks gridlocking access roads to the airport, severely impairing its functionality.

One possible path forward could be corporatization: converting the airport from a state enterprise into a joint-stock company wholly owned by the state. This model, mentioned in the draft Civil Aviation Strategy 2030 as a potential option for Boryspil, would allow a clearer separation of ownership and management functions, improve transparency, and create conditions for partnering with concessionaires or strategic investors. So far, there is no indication that this model is under consideration for Lviv.

The airport’s institutional weaknesses are further reflected in its lack of corporate governance structures such as a supervisory board or board of directors—tools that are essential for consistent strategic oversight.

Among the strongest arguments in favor of Lviv’s postwar prospects is its impressive prewar growth. Between 2015 and 2019, passenger numbers increased annually by 36% to 48%, driven by aviation liberalization, low-cost carriers, tourism growth, and infrastructure upgrades.

Following 2022, Lviv has become a humanitarian, administrative, and cultural center for western Ukraine, hosting hundreds of thousands of internally displaced persons. Many have since integrated, contributing to a more affluent population, new travel patterns, and growing demand for air services. Combined with the return of Ukrainians previously reliant on Polish airports, a 35–40% annual growth rate in the first 3–5 years after airspace reopening seems feasible.

But these projections are far from guaranteed. Without changes to the governance model, greater openness to partners, and a clear marketing strategy, Lviv risks missing the opportunity to establish itself as Ukraine’s western aviation hub.

Given the satisfactory condition of the airport’s infrastructure, classical PPP models such as BOT (Build–Operate–Transfer) appear unlikely at this stage. Nonetheless, alternative scenarios for private sector involvement are feasible, including:

• long-term operational contracts for terminals or new infrastructure (such as the cargo terminal),
• joint ventures with logistics providers or infrastructure funds,
• franchising models for ground services that do not involve asset ownership transfers.

All these models can be implemented under current Ukrainian law, without changing the airport’s legal status. However, they require clear role separation between the state owner, the airport’s management, and the private partner. This makes a combination of corporatization and PPP scenario planning a logical starting point for reform.

⮚ TL;DR: Lviv Airport holds strong postwar potential but operates without a development strategy, corporate governance, or investment-linked KPIs. Without institutional reform and private capital engagement, it risks falling behind. Corporatization combined with flexible PPP arrangements may offer the best first step.

Odesa International Airport is Ukraine’s third-largest airport and serves as a cornerstone of the southern port region’s transport infrastructure. Between 2017 and 2019, passenger numbers grew steadily; even during the post-COVID year, the airport handled approximately 1.4 million passengers.

In 2017, a new terminal was completed to serve both charter and international scheduled flights. In 2020, the state initiated the planning for the comprehensive reconstruction of the airfield complex, including the construction of a new runway, which became operational in mid-2021. Roughly UAH 2.8 billion of public investment went into this project. The new runway enables operations of wide-body aircraft in all-weather conditions—but despite this, during the war it has not been used for cargo logistics or humanitarian aviation. Instead, the infrastructure remains largely idle, contributing no significant national benefit.

The airport’s ownership history is complex and warrants close scrutiny. In 2011, a private company—LLC “Odesa International Airport”—was formed for reconstruction, with the city council contributing approximately 25% of the terminal assets and private investors (Kaufman and Borukhovych, formerly Granovskyi) acquiring 75% through LLC Odesa Airport Development. This ownership structure enabled over a decade of politico-corrupt control, culminating in a headline-making criminal case. On June 12, 2025, Ukraine’s High Anti-Corruption Court approved a plea agreement involving seven defendants, leading to the return of the terminal assets to city ownership. Notably, ownership structure, including the 75% stake, remains with those implicated in the case—highlighting a legal and reputational contradiction.

In this legally ambiguous situation, any new investment or partnership initiative is effectively blocked. Firstly, a professional investor, logistics operator, or airline is unlikely to enter into negotiations with an entity tied to criminal proceedings. Secondly, the absence of an official position from the city council—despite its formal ownership—makes it impossible to assess risks related to potential court-mandated changes in ownership. Thirdly, the lack of clarity around legal ownership of the runway and ground infrastructure between the LLC and the municipality severely complicates any PPP agreement.

That said, several institutional reset scenarios could be considered. These include corporatization followed by concession, as seen in Zagreb Airport in Croatia; or models similar to Lithuania’s Baltic Ground Services, which operates airport ground services under contract without infrastructure ownership. Both models offer potential relevance for secondary Ukrainian airport assets.

However, implementing any such scenario requires first clearing up ownership anomalies, legally restructuring the airport entity, revising regional aviation policy, and defining Odesa’s role as Ukraine’s southern hub. Without these foundational steps, the airport will remain an investment-dead asset despite its technical strength.

Nevertheless, Odesa is uniquely positioned to serve in Ukraine’s humanitarian and postwar recovery transport network. It is the only major Ukrainian city with sea access operating a newly constructed runway and established services from international carriers (Turkish Airlines, LOT, Austrian Airlines, Wizz Air, etc.) before 2022. Yet as of 2025, no publicly available strategic documents define its role in postwar recovery, logistics, security infrastructure, or cross-border trade.

Key indicators—such as readiness for cargo operations, signed agreements with logistics operators, retention of staff, and engagement with airlines—are all absent from public records. Neither the city council nor the Ministry for Communities & Territories has released a comprehensive vision. This contrasts sharply with European postconflict frameworks where airport relaunches often begin with institutional rebranding—corporatization followed by agreements with logistics and airline operators. In Ukraine’s limited resource environment, Odesa risks missing the chance to emerge as a southern transport hub. Moreover, the airport currently faces a trust deficit: government authorities and potential investors await clear institutional direction and legal safeguards for capital.

From a commercial perspective, interest remains high. Ryanair has publicly expressed intentions to expand into Ukrainian markets postwar, including Odesa—contingent on runway restoration and flexible fee structures. Furthermore, Odesa is integral to multimodal logistics chains, particularly in connection with its port—suggesting the viability of an “airport + port” model. Comparable paradigms exist in cities like Gdańsk and Rotterdam. Without an institutional framework or adequate financial incentives for airlines, however, that potential will remain unrealized.

Competitive pressures will intensify postwar—not only across Ukrainian hubs like Kyiv, Lviv, and Odesa, but also from Polish airports. Odesa has clear advantages—maritime access, business and tourism infrastructure, and a growing diaspora—but without a structured national aviation strategy explicitly incorporating it, these assets remain declarative rather than operational.

Technical and procedural needs remain too: modernizing navigation systems to meet ICAO/EASA safety zones, for instance. But regardless of those improvements, the critical imperative is establishing a coherent institutional model: should Odesa stay a municipally subsidized entity or evolve into a strategic hub via a private operator, concessionaire, or infrastructure investment fund? These questions remain unanswered, leaving Odesa at a crossroads. Its runway can support postwar growth—but without strategic vision, political will for institutional reform, or readiness for private-sector collaboration, its potential risks being squandered. Unlike Lviv—where targeted investment exists—or Boryspil with its 2045 strategy, Odesa remains an infrastructure asset with high potential but no roadmap—an unaffiliated element in Ukraine’s postwar aviation planning.

⮚ TL;DR: Odesa Airport has the physical infrastructure, commercial interest, and logistical positioning to become a regional hub. However, it lacks a strategy or investor-ready model. Without institutional reform and public-private collaboration, it risks staying a high-potential asset with no development trajectory.

Based on a comparative analysis of the current state of Boryspil, Lviv, and Odesa airports, several core expectations emerge for the upcoming strategic study by IFC and the EBRD. These institutions are known for pragmatic, staged approaches to infrastructure reform. Rather than advocating full privatization, they typically promote flexible forms of private-sector participation—such as concessions, service contracts, or operational agreements—tailored to each airport’s legal status, institutional capacity, and political backing.

Boryspil Airport is unlikely to be offered to private management at this stage. The Ukrainian government appears committed to retaining full control, with consistent investments in expansion and modernization. Boryspil is viewed as a symbol of state capability—“the nation’s gateway”—and is expected to be the first to reopen when the flight ban is lifted. In this context, IFC/EBRD engagement is more likely to focus on strengthening operational efficiency, anti-corruption safeguards, and public-private partnerships in auxiliary services (e.g., cargo, parking, or catering), rather than rethinking governance models.

By contrast, Lviv Airport appears to be a natural candidate for a pilot private-sector partnership. It benefits from solid prewar passenger growth, modern infrastructure, and strategic location near the EU border. Government funding has been minimal, and the state has not signaled a strong strategic attachment to the asset. For IFC, this creates an opportunity to structure an operational concession with performance-based milestones and monitoring systems. The EBRD is likely to focus on building an institutional framework to enhance the airport’s bankability. Lviv may well be proposed as the study’s demonstration case.

The most complex case is Odesa Airport. For over a decade, a murky hybrid structure—combining a municipal enterprise and a private LLC of the same name—has fostered legal and operational uncertainty. Even after the June 12, 2025 decision by Ukraine’s High Anti-Corruption Court, which returned part of the terminal to city ownership, the operating infrastructure remains under the control of businessmen implicated in the criminal case. Unless the ownership structure is clarified and legally restructured, any public-private partnership would face insurmountable risks. This is where the greatest methodological flexibility will be required. The task is not to design a concession model per se, but to create the institutional and legal conditions for such a model to be possible in the future. The Odesa case may become a test of IFC’s ability to align technical solutions with political constraints—and of the EBRD’s capacity to exert institutional pressure on municipal authorities.

In short, expectations from the IFC/EBRD study must be differentiated:

• In Boryspil, the goal is optimization within the public model.
• In Lviv, it’s the preparation of a pilot project for private operation.
• In Odesa, it’s resolving legal uncertainty and institutional deadlock.

This phased approach aligns with global best practices in post-conflict infrastructure recovery: the flagship airport remains state-run, pilot experiments occur in secondary nodes, and problematic assets must first be brought to legal clarity before any investment scenario can be considered. If Ukraine does receive grant or project-based support from IFC/EBRD, it must be deployed with this nuance in mind.

⮚ TL;DR: The IFC/EBRD study is expected to take a tailored approach: Boryspil remains under state control, Lviv becomes a pilot for private operation, and Odesa requires institutional cleanup before any partnership is possible. This approach aligns with international norms for infrastructure reform in post-conflict settings.

Since February 24, 2022, Ukraine’s airspace has remained closed to all civilian aviation. Despite occasional optimism from officials, no concrete timeline has been announced for reopening. All Ukrainian airports have entered a suspended state—without passenger traffic, without revenue, but still burdened with the costs of securing critical infrastructure, retaining staff, and performing essential maintenance. At this stage, the challenge is no longer just preserving the technical functionality of airports, but preserving their purpose as multimodal hubs—even in the absence of flights.

This is where an innovative solution comes into play—one that aligns with the phased, risk-adjusted strategies promoted by institutions like the IFC and EBRD, while also offering immediate, tangible benefits to passengers, operators, and the state. The concept involves creating “airport links“: dedicated cross-border bus routes connecting Ukrainian airports with functioning airports in neighboring EU countries.

Under this model, passengers would book a combined ticket—one part for their flight departing from an EU hub (e.g., Rzeszów, Košice, Iași, or Chișinău), and another for a direct “airport bus” from a Ukrainian city (e.g., Lviv, Uzhhorod, Chernivtsi, Odesa) to that EU airport. Critically, border and customs checks would take place inside the Ukrainian airport terminal, before departure. The bus would then travel uninterrupted across the border in a sealed, monitored mode—without stops or further controls—arriving directly at the foreign terminal.

Such models are already in operation across Europe, demonstrating both legal viability and passenger appeal. For example:

• • Dublin and Shannon Airports (Ireland): Implement a U.S. preclearance system that allows travelers to complete all U.S. immigration and customs checks before boarding. Upon arrival in the U.S., they are treated as domestic arrivals, without further screening.

• • EuroAirport Basel–Mulhouse–Freiburg: Serves France, Switzerland, and Germany, with special access roads allowing Swiss passengers to reach the terminal without crossing through French customs, thanks to a designated international zone.

• • Flibco’s Door2Gate (Brussels Charleroi): Offers seamless bus-to-terminal transfers with advance passenger screening, shortening layover times and improving connection reliability.

These examples prove three things:

1. Border checks can legally occur before reaching the border.
2. Such systems are grounded in bilateral or multilateral international agreements.
3. Air travel is not a prerequisite—ground transportation can serve as a legitimate part of the air-travel chain.

For Ukraine, this creates an opportunity to launch “airport bus corridors” with the following core elements:

• Passengers undergo passport and customs checks at a Ukrainian airport facility.
• Buses operate as sealed, international transfers, escorted by customs officers or border guards.
• Upon arrival, passengers walk directly into the international terminal of the foreign airport—just as if they had flown there.

The benefits are immediate and multifaceted. Travelers gain predictability: no long lines at border crossings, no risk of missed connections. Ukrainian airports reanimate part of their logistics infrastructure—customs, security, ground staff, parking services, catering. Bus operators gain incentives to formalize operations and integrate into institutional logistics. Most importantly, it creates a framework for low-risk public-private partnerships, even while the sky remains closed.

Politically, this model shows responsiveness. It tells Ukrainian passengers: we haven’t left you behind. It also benefits Ukrainian airlines—many now based abroad—by increasing access to their flights for domestic customers and expanding their reservation base. Institutionally, this model serves as a real-world rehearsal for coordination across border agencies, ministries, local authorities, and international partners. It trains the system in joint action before complex infrastructure PPPs even begin.

Internationally, it demonstrates the kind of operational adaptability that post-conflict financiers value: modular, scalable, infrastructure-light, and grounded in existing law. Unlike airfield reconstruction, it does not require new legislation or billions in capital. It can be implemented now—with political will and a coordinated administrative push.

At its core, an airport is not just a runway. It is a point of national contact, a space of trust and service, a first impression. If we can keep that point alive—even without planes—we are not waiting for victory to act. We are continuing a logic of smart resilience. That, in essence, is what a real aviation strategy looks like.

⮚ TL;DR: Even with closed skies, Ukrainian airports can function as logistical hubs via international “airport bus corridors” to EU airports. This enhances mobility, reactivates infrastructure, and fits international post-conflict strategies. Most importantly, it’s deployable immediately—no need to wait for the war to end.

Prepared by Ganna Tsirat
Doctor in Law, attorney, and expert in aviation law, airport infrastructure, and international trade