Holding Russia to Account: ICAO’s MH17 Ruling and Global Implications

The ICAO press release of 12 May 2025—finding that the Russian Federation failed to uphold its obligations under international air law in the downing of Malaysia Airlines Flight MH17 in July 2014—served as the catalyst for this analysis. That determination marked the first time the ICAO Council has ruled on the merits of a dispute between Member States under Article 84 of the Chicago Convention. By formally identifying Russia’s breach of its duty to “refrain from resorting to the use of weapons against civil aircraft in flight,” the Council has set in motion negotiations on reparations and underscored the need for robust accountability mechanisms in conflict zones.

This article will:

1. Examine the legal and factual underpinnings of the ICAO decision
2. Trace the sequence of criminal, civil, and human-rights proceedings that followed MH17
3. Analyze the various compensation schemes available to States and victims
4. Assess the broader implications for international aviation safety and dispute settlement.

Through this lens, we aim to draw lessons for future overflight risk management and enforcement of international air law obligations.

Since spring 2014, eastern Ukraine’s Donetsk and Luhansk regions had been the scene of heavy fighting between Ukrainian forces and Russian-backed separatists. Well before 17 July 2014, the State Aviation Administration of Ukraine issued NOTAMs restricting civil flights below 32,000 ft (9,800 m) over Donetsk and Luhansk airspace; it did not, however, close the airspace entirely or advise against routine overflights at cruise altitude.

On 17 July 2014, Malaysia Airlines Flight MH17—a Boeing 777-200ER (registration 9M-MRD) carrying 283 passengers (from ten nations) and 15 Malaysian crew members—was struck southwest of the village of Hrabove (Grabovo) in Donetsk region. A Russian-made Buk surface-to-air missile detonated beside the cockpit, causing catastrophic structural failure to its body. All 298 people on board perished.

From the moment of impact, Ukrainian agencies led the on-site recovery and evacuation of remains. Between 18 and 21 July, teams from Ukraine’s Ministry of Emergency Situations—operating under the oversight of armed separatist forces—secured and bagged bodies alongside OSCE monitors and rebel liaisons. By the evening of 21 July, approximately 272 bodies had been retrieved and loaded into refrigerated rail cars. Those remains departed the crash zone on 21 July and arrived at the Malyshev Factory in Kharkiv on 22 July, where Ukraine’s Foreign Ministry coordinated handover to Dutch forensic experts. The Netherlands-led DVI (Disaster Victim Identification) operation continued intermittently until November 2014.

The ICAO and its industry partners, IATA, ACI, and CANSO issued a joint statement on 29 July 2014 condemning using weapons against civil aircraft and urging all carriers and States to implement robust overflight risk assessments in conflict zones. That statement led to ICAO Doc 10084 and its Task Force on Risks to Civil Aviation from Conflict Zones, which remains the benchmark for global conflict-zone guidance

The investigative response to MH17 began almost immediately after the disaster. On 18 July 2014, the Dutch Safety Board opened its formal inquiry to determine how the aircraft was brought down. Within weeks, on 7 August 2014, the Dutch Public Prosecution Service, together with Australian, Belgian, and Ukrainian authorities (and Malaysia joining shortly thereafter), established the Joint Investigation Team to pursue the criminal aspects of the case.

On 19 June 2019, the Dutch Public Prosecution Service announced it would prosecute four suspects under Dutch law for the downing of MH17, charging them with murder in connection with the deaths of all 298 persons on board (The fourth suspect, Oleg Pulatov, was later released from the indictment due to insufficient evidence.) The first court session convened on 9 March 2020 at the District Court of The Hague, during which the public prosecutor formally presented the charges.

On 17 November 2022, the court delivered its verdict: three defendants were convicted in absentia and sentenced to life imprisonment under Dutch criminal law:

• Igor Girkin (Strelkov), former Russian intelligence officer
• Sergei Dubinskiy, former Russian intelligence officer
• Leonid Kharchenko, Ukrainian separatist leader

This conviction entails international arrest warrants—restricting travel to EU member states and the U.S.—and led to their inclusion on sanctions lists of the EU, Australia and others, with frozen assets and travel bans.

Russia officially refused to extradite the convicted.

No recorded attempts have been made to recover compensation from the Russian Federation in Dutch courts individually. In the Netherlands, the state brought all criminal claims against specific perpetrators, not the victims’ families.

The families of six flight attendants sued Malaysia Airlines in a Malaysian court for “negligence” and “breach of contract”. All claims were resolved through undisclosed out-of-court settlements within the Montreal Convention’s strict-liability limits.

Fifteen passenger families filed two collective suits in Malaysia under the Montreal Convention, contending that the chosen route over eastern Ukraine was unreasonably risky. These, too, ended in confidential settlements, without any judicial finding extending liability beyond the Convention’s cap. 

Under Articles 21–22 of the Montreal Convention, a carrier’s strict liability for passenger death is capped at 128,821 SDR per person (approximately USD 175,000 at the exchange rate in 2016).

Several next-of-kin have lodged individual complaints under Article 34 of the ECHR, alleging Russia’s violations of Article 2 (Right to Life); Article 3 (Prohibition of Inhuman or Degrading Treatment); Article 8 (Right to Respect for Family and Private Life), and Article 13 (Right to an Effective Remedy) (for example, Ayley and Others v. Russia, No. 25714/16, and Angline and Others v. Russia, No. 56328/18).

On 3 April 2019, ECHR communicated both cases to Russia and invited written observations on jurisdiction and merits.

On 16 March 2022, the Russian Federation notified the Secretary General of the Council of Europe of its denunciation of the European Convention on Human Rights. Under Article 58 of the Convention, such denunciation “shall not affect any right which has already arisen under this Convention” before the date of receipt of the notification. As all individual applications and the inter-state case were lodged and communicated before that date, the Court’s jurisdiction remains fully intact.

If the Court finds violations, it may award moral-damage compensation (typically tens of thousands of euros per applicant), legal costs, and other relief under Article 41 ECHR.

As of May 2025, the proceedings remain at the written submissions stage; no final judgment or “just satisfaction” award has been issued.

In May 2016, a group of 33 next-of-kin—primarily relatives of Australian, New Zealand, and Malaysian nationals—filed a compensation claim in the European Court of Human Rights naming both the Russian Federation and President Vladimir Putin as respondents. They sought $10 million in respect of each victim, arguing that Russia bore responsibility for the downing of MH17 and the consequent loss of life. As of May 2025, the LHD-filed claim against Russia/Putin has made no visible progress on the ECHR’s public HUDOC docket: it has not appeared among the inter-State or individual cases communicated to Russia, suggesting that the Court has either not yet admitted it or has not published its status. Accordingly, potential compensation remains speculative, limited by Article 41’s norms and the lack of any binding finding on Russia’s responsibility in this private suit.

On 10 July 2020, the Kingdom of the Netherlands filed Application No. 28525/20, explicitly addressing the downing of Flight MH17 on 17 July 2014 and breaches of Articles 2 (Right to life), 8 (Right to respect for private and family life) and 13 (Right to an effective remedy) (Netherlands v. Russia – MH17).

On 25 January 2023, the Grand Chamber declared the inter-State application partly admissible, confirming it could proceed on the merits. The decision is final, clearing the way for a full judgment on Russia’s alleged violations.

A merits hearing is pending, and no judgment has been issued. Possible outcomes include a finding of international responsibility of the Russian Federation for failing to protect the right to life of MH17 passengers and their families, prescription of general measures requiring Russia to prevent recurrence of similar violations, and provision for “just satisfaction” under Article 41, potentially including compensation to the Netherlands and/or direct awards to next-of-kin.

The authority for the ICAO Council to adjudicate the MH17 dispute springs directly from Article 84 of the Chicago Convention, which provides that any disagreement between Contracting States “relating to the interpretation or application of this Convention and its Annexes” that cannot be settled by negotiation “shall, on the application of any State concerned in the disagreement, be decided by the Council”. Notably, Article 84 of the Convention applies to claims for “damage sustained in case of an accident to a civil aircraft.” It contains no withdrawal provision—meaning no State can opt out of this mechanism simply by denouncing other parts of the Convention.

The dispute formally began on 14 March 2022, when Australia and the Netherlands jointly submitted their application to the ICAO Council under Article 84 of the Convention in respect of the downing of MH17 by a Buk missile over eastern Ukraine. In June 2024, Russia’s Foreign Ministry publicly declared it “does not recognize the Council’s authority” and would cease participation in the proceedings. That announcement, however, does not amount to a valid denunciation under Article 95 of the Chicago Convention, which requires formal notification to the Government of the United States with denunciation taking effect one year after receipt of the notice. Because Russia never transmitted such a notification, the Convention remains entirely in force for the Russian Federation.

Nor does Article 84’s Convention binding effect rest on Russia’s cooperation alone. If a State refuses to comply with a Council determination, Article 88 of the Chicago Convention empowers the ICAO Assembly, by a two-thirds majority of States present and voting, to suspend that State’s voting power in both the Assembly and the Council, applying diplomatic leverage even in the absence of judicial enforcement. Russia could vote against its suspension, but could not block a two-thirds majority of other Member States.

On 12 May 2025, after examining written and oral submissions across multiple sessions, the ICAO Council concluded that the Russian Federation had “failed to uphold its obligations under international air law” by permitting the launch of a Buk surface-to-air missile at MH17 in July 2014. This was the first time the Council ruled on the merits of a Member-State dispute under Article 84 of the Chicago Convention, formally declaring Russia’s responsibility “well-founded in fact and in law”. That finding both establishes a clear legal basis for reparations negotiations under Article 84 of the Convention and reaffirms the Convention’s fundamental principle that Contracting States must refrain from using weapons against civilian aircraft in flight.

Any appeal from the Council’s determination lies directly with the International Court of Justice under Article 84 of the Convention. In practical terms, however, Russia’s non-participation means that settlement negotiations will rely heavily on the Council’s diplomatic and moral authority rather than an enforceable adversarial hearing.

The Council determined, by majority vote, that the claims brought by the Netherlands and Australia “were well founded in fact and in law,” concluding that the Russian Federation had failed to uphold its obligations under Article 3-bis of the Chicago Convention by allowing the use of a Buk surface-to-air missile against a civilian aircraft in flight.

For the first time in ICAO history, the Council ruled on the merits of a Member-State dispute under Article 84 of the Chicago Convention, thereby validating ICAO’s Chapter XVIII dispute-settlement mechanism and setting a precedent for future state-to-state claims.

The Council formally called on the Russian Federation to enter into good-faith negotiations with the Netherlands and Australia to agree on “appropriate terms of settlement,” and instructed ICAO’s Secretariat to facilitate those talks under a prescribed timeline.

The press release reaffirmed the Convention’s fundamental principle that Contracting States must “refrain from using weapons against civil aircraft in flight,” underscoring the need for rigorous risk assessments and overflight protocols in conflict zones.

Finally, the Council noted that, should negotiations fail, either party may appeal the Council’s determination to the International Court of Justice under Article 84, preserving a clear judicial avenue for enforcement.

The ICAO Council’s merits ruling fundamentally reshapes the framework for state-to-state reparation talks, turning a diplomatic “ask” into an obligation grounded in Article 84 of the Chicago Convention. First, by declaring the Netherlands’ and Australia’s claims “well-founded in fact and in law,” the Council has created a binding mandate: Russia must now come to the table for good-faith negotiations on compensation rather than dismiss or ignore the claims.

Critically, the Council’s decision also defines the scope and scale of those claims. For the Netherlands, the baseline is already well quantified: approximately €166 million in direct costs for repatriation, identification, investigation, and prosecution, plus €16.5 million in interim family payments—together about €182.5 million to date. Australia has not publicly detailed its total outlays. Still, its claim will similarly include law enforcement and forensic costs incurred by the Australian Federal Police and support services for the 38 Australian victims’ families. On top of these hard expenses, both States will press for moral-damage components—reparative sums to reflect grief, trauma, and memorial upkeep—likely amounting to tens of millions more.

The Council’s ruling also leverages diplomatic pressure. While ICAO cannot enforce payment, Russia’s non-participation and refusal to recognize the Council’s authority now stand exposed before the entire assembly of Contracting States. That moral weight—and the technical threat of appealing to the ICJ under the Convention’s incorporated Statute—significantly strengthens the negotiating position of the Netherlands and Australia.

Finally, this process sets a template for future disputes: any State whose civil aircraft is damaged or destroyed in conflict zones can now look to Chapter XVIII’s procedures before pursuing unilateral remedies. The reparations negotiations will almost certainly establish a structured settlement formula—recovering direct costs, awarding interim family payments, and adding moral-damage awards—that will serve as the global benchmark for state-to-state claims arising from civil aviation accidents in active conflict areas.

State-level reparations under ICAO should begin by translating the Council’s 12 May 2025 finding into an objective, auditable framework for quantifying and allocating compensation. First, the negotiating States must present a consolidated schedule of incurred costs: roughly €166 million in direct investigation, identification, repatriation, and prosecution expenses incurred by the Netherlands, plus €16.5 million in interim family payments, and Australia’s mirror-image tally of law-enforcement, forensic, and victim-support outlays. Anchoring the claims in verifiable accounting establishes a baseline of approximately €200 million per claimant State before any moral-damage component is considered.

Beyond reimbursement of hard costs, the Council should steer negotiations toward a supplementary moral-damage fund to acknowledge collective grief and societal loss. A practical formula might combine full reimbursement of verifiable expenditures with a flat per-victim uplift—say € 50,000 per passenger—dedicated to psychosocial services, memorial upkeep, and educational outreach. This dual-track approach mirrors precedents in other treaty fora (for example, the UN Compensation Commission after the Kuwait/Iraq conflict in the Gulf War and the Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission), where States agreed to channel reparations into independently administered trust funds to ensure transparency, prompt distribution, and public accountability. Although the Chicago Convention does not prescribe a “reparation trust,” these well-recommended practices provide a proven mechanism that parties can voluntarily adopt under Article 84’s “appropriate terms of settlement.”

Finally, any settlement must embed clear enforceability and reporting. The parties could agree that Russia will transfer negotiated sums into a jointly overseen reparation trust within six months of signature, with quarterly audits reported to ICAO’s Council. Should Russia default on payments, the Convention’s incorporated ICJ Statute allows referral to the International Court of Justice. At the same time, Article 88 of the Chicago Convention empowers the Assembly to suspend Russia’s voting rights as diplomatic leverage. By combining rigorous cost accounting, a principled moral-damage uplift based on standard international practice, and enforceable compliance triggers, ICAO’s state-level reparations mechanism can deliver justice for MH17’s victims and a durable template for future civil aviation disputes in conflict zones.

Families of MH17 victims have pursued compensation through two parallel channels: individual “just satisfaction” claims before the European Court of Human Rights and out-of-court settlements or limited suits under domestic law against the carrier and its insurers. Under Article 41 of the ECHR, next-of-kin may seek moral-damage awards once the Court finds that Russia violated rights such as the right to life (Article 2) and effective remedy (Article 13). Although applicants initially sought multi-million-euro sums—for example, A$10 million per passenger in a private suit lodged in 2016—ECHR jurisprudence confirms that moral-damage awards typically range in the tens of thousands of euros per claimant, plus reimbursement of legal costs. These awards, once formalized, carry full legal force and must be paid by the respondent State unless successfully appealed to the ICJ under the Convention’s incorporated Statute.

At the same time, many families have engaged in domestic claims against Malaysia Airlines and its insurers under the Montreal Convention’s strict liability regime. This avenue caps carrier liability at 128,821 SDR (≈ € 150,000–180,000 depending on exchange rates), with out-of-court settlements negotiated within those bounds. In June and July 2016, crew relatives and passenger families filed negligence and breach-of-contract suits in Malaysian courts; all were resolved by confidential settlements that adhered to the Convention’s liability ceiling. While these settlements lack precedent-setting judicial findings of unlimited fault, they provide swift, predictable relief to families and demonstrate the practicality of domestic remedies when large-scale collective actions are impractical.

Together, these family-level mechanisms offer both symbolic and tangible redress. ECHR awards, once issued, carry the moral authority of a binding international judgment and underscore State responsibility for human-rights breaches. By contrast, domestic settlements under the Montreal Convention deliver timely financial support to cover funeral, medical, and psycho-social costs, albeit within a defined cap. As the ECHR cases progress toward merits hearings and settlement negotiations continue, families can expect combined recoveries that blend modest moral-damage awards with cap-level compensation, providing victims’ relatives practical assistance while reinforcing the broader accountability architecture for MH17.

The International Criminal Court offers a complementary avenue for accountability when civil aviation incidents in conflict zones may constitute war crimes or crimes against humanity. Ukraine’s early acceptance of the ICC’s jurisdiction in November 2013 opened the door for the Court to investigate any “act of violence” occurring on Ukrainian territory from February 2014 onward, including the downing of MH17. In practice, the ICC’s Office of the Prosecutor has focused on broader patterns of war crimes in eastern Ukraine. Still, the principles it applies—individual criminal responsibility for ordering or carrying out attacks on civilians—would squarely encompass the use of a Buk missile against a passenger airliner.

Because Russia is not a party to the Rome Statute, the ICC cannot exercise territorial jurisdiction over Russian nationals acting outside Ukrainian territory unless the acts occurred on Ukrainian soil or were committed by individuals within ICC custody. In MH17’s case, the crash took place over Ukraine, which removes any formal barrier to investigation; nonetheless, effective prosecution requires the arrest and surrender of suspects, something unlikely without Russia’s cooperation or a U.N. Security Council referral.

Beyond the ICC, various quasi-judicial and national mechanisms can fill the enforcement gap. The U.N. Human Rights Council’s Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine gathers evidence and issues recommendations for prosecutions. Individual States retain universal-jurisdiction statutes permitting domestic courts to try war crimes suspects regardless of where the alleged atrocities occurred—an option already invoked by the Netherlands in the MH17 criminal trial. Finally, proposals for an ad hoc tribunal under U.N. auspices mirror precedents set for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. However, Russia’s veto power in the Security Council renders such a tribunal politically unfeasible.

These forums—ICC, national courts exercising universal jurisdiction, human-rights commissions, and ad hoc tribunal proposals—create a web of overlapping accountability pathways. While none alone can guarantee that the masterminds behind MH17 will stand trial, their combined pressure underscores the international community’s determination to pursue justice, deter future attacks on civil aviation, and affirm that the deliberate targeting of civilians can never escape scrutiny.

The MH17 tragedy and the subsequent ICAO Council ruling have profoundly reshaped the global approach to overflight risk management. First, States and carriers now treat conflict-zone advisories as mandatory route planning components. ICAO’s Task Force on Risks to Civil Aviation from Conflict Zones has accelerated the development of high-resolution threat-mapping tools and real-time intelligence-sharing protocols, ensuring that NOTAMs and conflict-zone NOTAMs (CZ-NOTAMs) reflect validated military activity rather than unverified reports. Airlines have integrated these data feeds into their flight-planning software, routinely recalculating optimal deviations to maintain safe vertical and lateral separation from hostilities.

At the regulatory level, ICAO has signaled that it will revise Annex 6 (Operation of Aircraft) to the Chicago Convention to require that States publish clear criteria for closing airspace or imposing altitude floors when armed conflict poses a credible risk. This builds on the Council’s affirmation that permitting weapons use against civilian aircraft breaches the Convention, prompting national regulators to issue binding “Conflict-Zone Overflight Regulations” rather than advisory circulars. In several jurisdictions, including the EU and Canada, regulators now conduct periodic audits of airline compliance with these rules, with financial penalties for failures in overflight risk assessment.

Insurance markets have responded by insisting on up-to-date conflict hazard assessments for hull-war and liability-war coverage. Insurers now require airlines to demonstrate documented evidence of dynamic route-risk evaluation for each flight traversing regions with any military engagement history. This linkage between regulatory standards and insurance underwriting creates a powerful economic motive for carriers to err on the side of caution.

Finally, the MH17 precedent has spurred aviation-safety bodies to forge closer ties with diplomatic and defense establishments. Regular liaison offices between civil aviation authorities and military commands are being established to deconflict civilian flight levels and corridors and ensure civilian routes are factored into military training and operations. The MH17 experience has transformed overflight safety from an afterthought into a core element of the global aviation safety regime by embedding conflict-zone safety into the DNA of regulatory oversight and industry practice.

Several multilateral treaties have long embodied standing dispute-settlement frameworks that offer helpful analogies for the Chicago Convention Article 84 mechanism. The World Trade Organization’s Dispute Settlement Understanding provides one of the most elaborate examples: panels of independent experts hear State-to-State complaints, issue reasoned rulings that are automatically adopted unless unanimously rejected, and prescribe “recommendations and rulings” that member governments are obliged to implement, with retaliation permissible for non-compliance. This system underscores the value of clear procedural timetables, binding panel reports, and a built-in appeal stage before a standing Appellate Body—features that could inspire refinements to ICAO’s largely diplomatic, non-judicial process.

The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea illustrates another model: Part XV mandates compulsory procedures before the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea or the International Court of Justice (unless parties opt for arbitration) for “any dispute concerning the interpretation or application” of the Convention. That Convention specifies time limits for written and oral proceedings, rules on third-party interventions, and strict timelines for provisional measures. It also guarantees that decisions are final and binding, effectively compelling compliance through the force of international legal obligation rather than political persuasion alone.

The ICSID Convention similarly offers lessons on enforcement. ICSID awards are automatically recognized and enforced in all contracting States as if they were national judgments, providing a powerful incentive for parties to abide by arbitral decisions. Although the Chicago Convention does not confer such enforceability, ICAO’s Council could strengthen its rulings by embedding clear referral paths to the ICJ or recommending that parties adopt a binding “award” procedure akin to ICSID, thereby reducing reliance on ad hoc diplomatic pressure.

Taken together, these precedents suggest that ICAO might consider:

1. Formalizing procedural timetables for written submissions, oral hearings, and Council deliberations;
2. Clarifying the binding nature of Council determinations and establishing an appeal mechanism to the ICJ with mandatory timelines;
3. Encouraging the incorporation of dispute-settlement “awards” into domestic legal systems for enforceability; and
4. Providing provisional measures to preserve evidence and rights pending final resolution.

By drawing on the WTO, UNCLOS, and ICSID models, ICAO can strengthen Chapter XVIII of the Chicago Convention processes, transforming what has been a rarely used diplomatic tool into a robust, credible mechanism capable of delivering consistent and enforceable outcomes for civil aviation disputes.

The aftermath of the MH17 ruling transcends legal arguments and enters the realm of geopolitics, where sanctions, diplomatic ripples, and enforcement limits converge. In the weeks following the ICAO Council’s finding, Western governments moved swiftly to expand and deepen targeted measures against individuals and entities tied to the missile supply chain and separatist command structures. New asset freezes and travel bans were layered on top of existing EU, U.S., U.K., and Canadian sanctions, signaling that refusal to engage with ICAO’s reparations process carries tangible costs beyond courtroom debates.

Diplomatically, Russia’s rejection of the Council’s authority and its unilateral withdrawal from the Article 84 proceedings have widened its isolation within aviation and multilateral circles. Several states have curtailed their technical and overflight cooperation with Moscow, while ICAO has paused invitations to Russian representatives for key safety working groups. This ostracism underscores how reputational pressure can sometimes outstrip procedural coercion, especially in civil aviation, where trust and information-sharing are indispensable.

Yet enforcing reparations against a non-compliant State remains a formidable challenge. The Chicago Convention offers no direct enforcement arm, and even its Article 88’s suspension of voting rights cannot compel Russia to pay. The only judicial backstop—the possibility of a referral to the International Court of Justice—hinges on Russia’s acceptance of ICJ jurisdiction, which it may well resist. As a result, the Netherlands and Australia must leverage a mosaic of diplomatic channels—linking ICAO outcomes to broader sanctions dialogues, tying future lifting of restrictions to progress in reparations, and enlisting allies in the UN and EU to keep pressure on.

Ultimately, the MH17 saga illustrates that securing accountability for civil aviation atrocities depends as much on sustained diplomatic unity and economic leverage as on legal verdicts. While sanctions and exclusion from aviation forums do not guarantee reparations, they create a landscape in which Russia’s continued resistance exacts a mounting toll on its global standing—and where, over time, compliance may begin to look the more attractive path.

The MH17 tragedy and the ensuing legal processes underscore that overflight safety in conflict zones can no longer rest on voluntary guidance or after-the-fact investigations. First, States must adopt mandatory, risk-based flight-planning rules: airspace above active hostilities should be closed by default or subject to strict altitude floors, with any deviations requiring regulator-approved risk assessments. Second, real-time intelligence-sharing networks—linking military commands, civil aviation authorities, and airlines—must be institutionalized. Secure digital platforms should feed verified threat data directly into flight-management systems so crews and dispatchers receive up-to-the-minute advisories without ambiguity.

Third, regulatory frameworks need teeth. Chicago Convention Annex 6 should be amended to empower national authorities to audit carriers’ conflict-zone compliance and to impose meaningful penalties—fines, license suspensions, or insurance surcharges—for failures in threat assessment. Insurers, in turn, must insist on documented proof of dynamic risk evaluations as a condition of war-risk coverage, creating a market-based incentive for vigilance.

Finally, civilian and military aviation bodies must forge enduring partnerships. Standing liaison offices and joint exercises will ensure that civilian route-planning is factored into military operations, deconflicting flight corridors, and minimizing inadvertent exposure to air defenses. By embedding these lessons—mandatory closures, real-time threat feeds, enforceable regulations, and civil-military collaboration—into rulebooks and practice, the industry can transform conflict-zone overflight from an unavoidable hazard into a managed risk.

Victims’ families and their legal teams should coordinate closely to ensure that all domestic, regional, and international avenues remain active and synchronized. In the coming months they will need to: secure witness and forensic evidence for the ECHR merits hearings; monitor ICAO’s facilitation of reparations talks and submit consolidated documentation of their individual losses; pursue any available civil-law remedies in States with universal-jurisdiction statutes; and advocate through victims’ coalitions for continued diplomatic pressure—linking the pace of sanctions relief to progress on compensation. Engaging reputable NGOs and human-rights rapporteurs will amplify their voice and help keep these cases on the global agenda.

States, for their part, must sustain unified diplomatic efforts while hardening legal leverage. They should press ICAO to set firm deadlines for settlement negotiations and, if necessary, prepare the grounds for an ICJ referral under the Convention’s Statute. Parallel ECHR inter-state and individual claims must be advanced to a merits judgment, and pending awards must be enforced through multilateral coordination, tying compliance to UN and EU policy decisions. National legislatures can reinforce universal jurisdiction and mutual legal assistance frameworks, while foreign policy teams link visa waivers and trade incentives to Russia’s reparations performance. By combining tenacious legal advocacy with strategic diplomacy, both families and States can keep accountability mechanisms moving forward and sustain the momentum needed to secure meaningful justice for MH17’s victims.

By Anna Tsirat | Dr. of Law & Advocate, Jurvneshservice